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BREAKING BARRIERS TO 
RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTION 
IN THE NORTH AMERICAN ARCTIC 
Henrik Strand* 
 
As climate change continues to affect our lives, the communities at the northern 
extremes of our world have witnessed the changes most profoundly. In the 
Arctic, where climate change is melting permafrost and causing major 
shoreline erosion, remote communities in Alaska and northern Canada are 
particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, these communities have limited access to 
electrical grids and bear oppressive energy costs relying on diesel generators. 
While some communities have started to incorporate renewable energy into 
their hamlets and villages, progress has generally been limited with the notable 
exception of Canada’s Northwest Territories and some coastal communities in 
western Alaska. During its latest stint as chair of the Arctic Council, the 
United States outlined community renewable energy in the Arctic as one of its 
primary goals. This Note focuses on regulatory and practical policy solutions 
to make that goal possible. It draws on examples from industrialized countries, 
such as Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as examples from developing 
countries, such as India and Peru, to examine solutions for the technical, 
economic, regulatory, and community engagement problems that Arctic 
communities in Alaska face when setting up new energy projects. Additionally, 
this Note describes the current political structure of Alaskan villages under the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and argues that Alaska Native 
Corporations should play a role in developing clean, cheap energy sources for 
their shareholders. Finally, this Note argues that public-private partnerships, 
like the non-profit Arctic Energy Alliance in the Northwest Territories, shows 
that clean, renewable energy projects for rural Arctic villages are possible 
throughout the Arctic. This Note draws lessons from other communities 
throughout the world and attempts to apply them to the unique situations that 




Copyright © 2018 by Henrik Strand.  
 *   J.D. Candidate, Texas A&M School of Law, 2018. The Author would like 
to thank everyone that helped him with the writing of this Note, including 
Vanessa Casado-Perez, Gabriel Eckstein, Louie Azzolini, and the Alaska Law 
Review staff. This Note would not have been possible without their continued 
support.  
35.1 STRAND (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  7:51 PM 
68 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1 
INTRODUCTION 
Unalakleet, Alaska is a small community on the edge of the United 
States. Situated along the Bering Sea, just south of the Seward Peninsula 
in western Alaska, this village of about 700 residents was once saddled by 
some of the highest energy costs for any village in the nation.1 For many 
rural Alaskan villages like Unalakleet, energy costs have been 
astronomical, reaching up to one dollar per kilowatt-hour when the 
national average is twelve cents.2 The use of costly and inefficient diesel 
generators that burn imported fuel during the long, cold winter months 
accounts for much of this expense.3 In 2009 however, Unalakleet installed 
enough wind turbines to produce 600 kilowatts of power, thus reducing 
the village’s demand for diesel fuel by thousands of gallons.4 It is in 
villages like Unalakleet where “[e]conomics, not the environment, are 
driving a shift to renewables.”5 Therefore, extensive wind resources 
available along the western Alaska coastline have become perfect places 
to experiment with small renewable power microgrids advocated for by 
groups like the Renewable Energy Alaska Project.6 
Rural Alaskans are not the only people who experience these drastic 
economic fuel costs. Colville Lake is a community in Canada’s Northwest 
Territories that endured a power crisis starting in 2015.7 Not only was 
Colville Lake one of the most expensive communities to power according 
to the Northwest Territories Power Company, it was powered exclusively 
by dirty, unreliable diesel generators.8 Even though the community was 
spending over $140,000 on diesel to power a town of 190 people annually,9 
the power source was so unreliable that the community experienced an 
average of one power outage per week, caused by power spikes from 
events as innocuous as too many stoves cooking dinner.10 Additionally, 
residents complained about the “smelly” air hanging low around the 
 
 1.  David W. Shaw, What Rural Alaska Can Teach the World About Renewable 
Energy, SCI. AM. (Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
what-rural-alaska-can-teach-the-world-about-renewable-energy/. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See id. (discussing the importation of fuel). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See Colville Lake, N.W.T., Now Powered by Solar/Diesel Hybrid System, CBC 
(Feb. 10, 2016, 7:00 AM) [hereinafter Colville Lake], http://www.cbc.ca/beta/ 
news/canada/north/colville-lake-solar-diesel-hybrid-power-1.3441205. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Robyn Burns, Colville Lake, N.W.T., Turns to Solar for Reliable Power, CBC 
(Dec. 29, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/colville-lake-
n-w-t-turns-to-solar-for-reliable-power-1.2833892. 
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hamlet and the poor air quality caused by continually operating diesel 
generators.11 
To solve this problem, the community banded together and worked 
with the Arctic Energy Alliance (AEA), a government affiliated non-profit 
society that implements community energy plans, to create a solar/diesel 
hybrid system that powers the community today.12 The current system 
may have cost $7.7 million to construct, but the Northwest Territories 
government only paid $1.3 million.13 The payment structure by the AEA 
promotes self-sufficiency and self-determination for villages without 
outside subsidy. Currently, the AEA works primarily in the Northwest 
Territories to coordinate between various governmental departments and 
agencies to provide a “coordinated approach to public education and 
delivery of energy conservation services.”14 It is precisely these types of 
success stories—created by partnerships between village tribal councils 
and governmental non-profits—that could be established throughout the 
Arctic if other countries can create organizations like the AEA, which 
enable Arctic communities to develop their own strategies for clean, 
cheap, renewable power. 
Climate change has hit Arctic communities hard over the last ten 
years. Villages in western Alaska have even had to relocate to the 
mainland as their historical towns, built on spits into the Bering Sea, have 
completely eroded.15 Additionally, as discussed above, many of these 
communities rely entirely on diesel generators.16 Despite these crippling 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Colville Lake, supra note 7; see generally Community Energy Plan: Behdzi Ahda 
First Nation (Colville Lake) 2010, ARCTIC ENERGY ALLIANCE (2010), http://aea.nt.ca/ 
communities/colville-lake (follow “Community Energy Plan” hyperlink). 
 13.  Colville Lake, supra note 7. 
 14.  About AEA, ARCTIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, http://aea.nt.ca/about-us (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2018). 
 15.  See Christopher Mele & Daniel Victor, Reeling From Effects of Climate 
Change, Alaskan Village Votes to Relocate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/us/shishmaref-alaska-elocate-vote-
climate-change.html?_r=0 (describing Shishmaref, Alaska’s decision to move its 
village); see also Alex DeMarban, $15 million from feds a ‘dream come true’ as Alaska 
village plans relocation, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-alaska/2018/03/26/15-million-in-
spending-bill-a-dream-come-true-as-alaska-village-plans-move/ (describing 
relocation of Newtok, Alaska nine miles inland to Mertarvik).  
 16.  See supra text accompanying note 7. Some of the larger communities that 
have year-round road access do have some natural gas but still have energy costs 
of over $8000 a year per capita (calculated based on the total population of 
Inuvik—3615—and the total cost of energy for the village—$30 million). ARCTIC 
ENERGY ALL., Inuvik Energy Profile 2007/08, (Mar. 30, 2010), http://aea.nt.ca/ 
communities/inuvik/ (follow “Community Energy Profile” hyperlink). Most of 
the communities run entirely on diesel and have energy costs up to 275% higher 
than the average American. Graelyn Brashear, Rural Alaska communities to get $16 
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energy costs, the growth of renewable energy projects in these rural 
communities throughout much of the Arctic has been slow.17 As chair of 
the Arctic Council between 2015 and 2017, the United States outlined 
community renewable energy in the Arctic as one of its primary goals.18 
This Note will focus on practical suggestions to make that goal a reality. 
While there are many commonalities between Arctic communities 
worldwide, for the purposes of focusing on policy solutions in Alaska’s 
villages, narrowing the scope of this paper will help eliminate variables 
irrelevant in Alaska. First, by concentrating primarily on Canada and 
Alaska, this Note focuses on common law jurisdictions that share similar 
regulatory structures and court proceedings, which do not exist in other 
Arctic countries rooted in the civil law tradition. 
Moreover, within Canada, the Northwest Territories is most like 
western Alaska because the majority of the communities in both areas are 
isolated, roadless, and currently use diesel generators as their primary 
form of power.19 These “energy islands” are the focus of this Note because 
they are the communities disproportionately affected by high energy 
costs and the current regulatory structure that favors large energy 
producers.20 
In addition, both of these regions have similar levels of infrastructure 
to support energy improvements, unlike the northeastern Canadian 
territory of Nunavut, which lags behind Alaska and the Northwest 
Territories for programs available for energy development.21 Yukon is 
 
million in federal energy grants, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Jun. 23, 2016), 
http://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/06/23/rural-alaska-communities-to-get-16-
million-in-federal-energy-grants/. 
 17.  See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth look at 
current fuel costs, see infra Part I. The Strategic Technical Assistance Response 
Team (START) program through the U.S. Department of Energy has supported a 
handful of projects in western Alaska. See U.S. DEP’T. ENERGY, Alaska Native 
Community Energy Planning and Projects (June 2013), https://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy13osti/58879.pdf. The Northwest Territories have many communities that 
have created community energy plans; these are organized together on the Arctic 
Energy Alliance’s website. See ARTIC ENERGY ALL., http://aea.nt.ca/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2018). 
 18.  David Hayes, As chair of Arctic Council, US could help the North replace 
costly, unhealthy diesel, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2014), 
http://www.adn.com/commentary/article/chair-arctic-council-us-could-help-
north-replace-costly-unhealthy-diesel/2014/08/25/; see U.S. ARCTIC COUNCIL 
TEAM, ONE ARCTIC (2015), http://www.arctic-council.org/images/PDF_ 
attachments/US_Chairmanship/Chairmanship_Brochure_2_page_public.pdf 
(discussing the role of the United States in chairing the Arctic Council). 
 19.  See infra Part I. 
 20.  See Frank R. Lindh & Thomas W. Bone, Jr., State Jurisdiction Over 
Distributed Generators, 34 ENERGY L.J. 499, 500–01 (2013) (discussing the “question 
of federal versus state jurisdiction over the activities of . . . generators”). 
 21.  See PATHS TO A RENEWABLE NORTH: A PAN-TERRITORIAL RENEWABLE 
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also not a good fit as a comparison to western Alaska because of its 
significant hydroelectricity capacity, which decreases territory-wide 
energy costs dramatically and reduces the need for more investment in 
renewable resources.22 
Even though the Northwest Territories and Alaska are similar in 
geographic and demographic make-up, they also have some differences. 
The Northwest Territories is not a province of Canada, which means that 
the territory can only exercise powers delegated to territories by the 
Parliament of Canada.23 Alaska, on the other hand, not only has greater 
control over the policies it can pursue, but also has the native corporation 
structure as a convenient way to create public-private partnerships.24 
Finally, the United States and Canada have different political cultures, as 
well as different official postures on climate change and the need for 
renewable energy.25 However, even with all of these differences, this Note 
will attempt to bridge the gap between the two communities to tease out 
solutions to community energy problems and improve the communities 
as a whole. 
 
 
ENERGY INVENTORY 9, 54, 57 (2011), https://www.eia.gov.nt.ca/sites/eia/files/ 
northern_vision_1.pdf (Northwest Territories & Nunavut); see also Map of 
Renewable Energy Installations, RENEWABLE ENERGY ALASKA PROJECT, 
http://alaskarenewableenergy.org/index.php/clean-energy-in-alaska/map-of-
re-installations/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2018) (map of Alaska renewable energy 
projects as of 2016). 
 22.  See YUKON ENERGY CORP., YUKON ENERGY: 2016 RESOURCE PLAN iv (2017), 
http://resourceplan.yukonenergy.ca/media/site_documents/Yukon_Energy_2
016_Resource_Plan.pdf (describing the Yukon electric grid as “predominately 
hydro”). Hydroelectricity is feasible for the majority of the population in the 
Yukon because of the concentration of the population around the upper Yukon 
River. While western Alaska and the Northwest Territories have major rivers, the 
widely dispersed population and the lack of roads and other transportation 
infrastructure makes major hydroelectricity infeasible for many of the smaller 
communities, even though micro-hydro projects have been used in some 
communities. See Second Largest Island in U.S. Goes 100% Renewable, ECOWATCH 
(May 20, 2015, 11:05 AM), https://www.ecowatch.com/second-largest-island-in-
u-s-goes-100- 
renewable-1882043985.html (showing that around 50 smaller hydro projects exist 
throughout Alaska, but most communities still use diesel generators for power). 
 23.  Provinces and Territories, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/ 
intergovernmental-affairs/services/provinces-territories.html (last modified 
Aug. 21, 2017). 
 24.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 25.  Compare Emily Holden, Climate Change Skeptics Run the Trump 
Administration, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2018, 5:07AM), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2018/03/07/trump-climate-change-deniers-443533, with Shawn 
McCarthy, Robert Fife, & Gloria Galloway, Trudeau Reaches Historic Deal on 
National Climate Plan, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.theglobe 
andmail.com/news/politics/national-climate-deal-reached-trudeau-
provinces/article33281195/.  
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Because these areas have more significant similarities than they do 
differences, this Note will outline some of the legal and policy barriers in 
Alaska and use different Canadian jurisdictions, especially the Northwest 
Territories, to outline potential solutions to the current barriers. Part I will 
outline the current state of energy production in remote villages in Alaska 
and northern Canada. Part II will describe the various barriers to 
renewable community projects in the Arctic and recommend solutions to 
these problems by highlighting programs that are already working to 
ameliorate these issues in the United Kingdom, India, and South America. 
Part III will focus on the different structures that are currently in place in 
Alaska and Canada designed to help native communities take control of 
their energy futures. This section will begin by comparing the corporate 
structures of the native corporations established by the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) to the Makivik Corporation in northern 
Quebec. Additionally, Part III will briefly discuss the AEA in the 
Northwest Territories as a case study for the proliferation of community 
energy plans throughout the Arctic. Throughout Parts II and III, this Note 
will summarize some of the most promising solutions to these barriers 
and make policy recommendations for the United States and the Arctic 
Council to consider moving forward. 
While there is not any one solution or set of solutions that can solve 
the problem of energy dependence in rural Arctic communities, looking 
comprehensively at the problem may spark discussion about these issues 
in multiple forums to tease out some solutions. This Note is aimed at 
policy makers, international NGOs, market participants, and local 
community leaders, all of whom must play an integral role in helping 
rural, isolated Arctic communities. 
I.  CURRENT ENERGY PRODUCTION IN ALASKA AND ARCTIC 
COMMUNITIES 
A.  Canada 
The Canadian Arctic falls primarily under the governance of three 
Canadian territories: the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. 
The Yukon Territory borders Alaska and is the smallest of these territories 
in land area. However, the city of Whitehorse is the largest population 
center in the Canadian Arctic, with 23,276 people. The Northwest 
Territories is centrally located in the Canadian Arctic, between the Yukon 
to the west and Nunavut to the east. The Northwest Territories is the most 
populous of the northern territories, and it is the second largest in land 
area. Its capital of Yellowknife is the second largest city in Canada’s far 
north. Nunavut is the largest of the northern territories in terms of area, 
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containing most of the far northern Canadian islands. It is also the least 
populated and poorest (in terms of gross domestic product) of the 
northern territories.26 
Energy use in northern Canada is markedly different from other 
parts of Canada. Nearly seventy-five percent of Canadian energy 
consumption is a “by-product of refined oil.”27 The majority is either fuel 
for heating or diesel for electricity generation.28 While natural gas is the 
primary energy source in all of Canada, only twelve percent of northern 
Canada’s energy is generated by natural gas, mostly around the Arctic 
Ocean bordering communities of Norman Wells and Inuvik in the 
Northwest Territories.29 There are likely three hundred (or more) isolated 
Canadian communities that rely on diesel electricity generation.30 
Nunavut is entirely powered by diesel generators.31 
Energy costs in the Arctic are also much higher than the rest of 
Canada, and per capita energy use is nearly double the Canadian 
average.32 Many communities are not accessible by road systems.33 There 
are no permanent highways in Nunavut.34 These communities are only 
accessible by small planes or marine vessels in the short open water 
season.35 Heating costs in these remote communities can be nearly ten 
times the heating cost in the northern Canadian city of Edmonton.36 With 
 
 26.  Compare Gross Domestic Product of Nunavut, Canada from 2000 to 2016 (In 
Million Canadian Dollars), STATISTA (2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/ 
577582/gdp-of-nunavut-canada/ ($2.443 billion in 2016), with Gross Domestic 
Product of Northwest Territories, Canada from 2000 to 2016 (In Million Canadian 
Dollars), STATISTA (2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/577578/gdp-of-
northwest-territories-canada/ ($ 4.739 billion in 2016) and Gross Domestic Product 
of Yukon, Canada from 2000 to 2016 (In Million Canadian Dollars), STATISTA (2018), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/577569/gdp-of-yukon-canada/  
($2.8 billion in 2016). 
 27.  Energy Use in Canada’s North: An Overview of Yukon, Northwest Territories, 
and Nunavut, NAT’L ENERGY BD., https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/ 
archive/2011nrgsncndnrthfct/nrgsncndnrthfct-eng.html (last modified Mar. 15, 
2017). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  GOV’T OF NW. TERRITORIES, ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE: AN ENERGY PLAN FOR 
THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES 10 (2007), www.iti.gov.nt.ca/publications/2007/ 
energy/Energy%20for%20the%20future.pdf (on file with author). 
35.1 STRAND (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  7:51 PM 
74 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1 
costs soaring upwards of $10,000 per person, energy costs for villagers 
who rely primarily on subsistence as a way of life can lead to widespread 
energy poverty37 for many northern residents.38 
Because of these high costs and inefficiencies, the northern territories 
have identified energy efficiency as a top priority.39 The Yukon has three 
hydroelectric plants that generate seventy-five megawatts of electricity 
and the Northwest Territories and Nunavut have hydroelectric potential, 
especially mini-hydro projects that do not require the level of finance 
required for major projects.40 Wind is also being investigated, but the 
“long term reliability, grid integration ability, and economic feasibility are 
not yet established.”41 As noted, solar/diesel hybrid generators are 
already in use in some communities in the Northwest Territories to 
reduce the reliance on fossil fuels.42 Biofuels, such as wood, are also used 
in some communities for heat production, and high efficiency pellet 





 37.  “Energy poverty” is a term that social scientists use to designate 
populations who do not have stable access to energy in developed nations. See 
KENNETH P. GREEN ET AL., FRASER INST., ENERGY COSTS AND CANADIAN HOUSEHOLDS: 
HOW MUCH ARE WE SPENDING? 9 (2016), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/ 
files/energy-costs-and-canadian-households.pdf. Recently, however, researchers have 
further defined the term as “the percentage of households in counties where 
electricity and natural gas expenditures exceed 10 percent of household income; 
and the percentage of households in counties where electricity spending alone 
exceeds 10 percent of household income.” Id. at 10 (quoting JONATHAN A. LESSER, 
CTR. FOR ENERGY POL’Y & THE ENV’T AT THE MANHATTAN INST., LESS CARBON, 
HIGHER PRICES: HOW CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE POLICIES AFFECT LOWER-INCOME 
RESIDENTS 9 (2015), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/eper_17.pdf). 
 38.  See id. at 14–20 (evaluating energy poverty within particular provinces in 
Canada). 
 39.  See, e.g., YUKON GOV’T, ENERGY STRATEGY FOR YUKON 3 (2009), 
http://www.energy.gov.yk.ca/pdf/energy_strategy.pdf (“Energy efficiency and 
conservation will be a priority to reduce energy consumption, energy costs and 
emissions.”); GOV’T OF NUNAVUT, IKUMMATIIT: THE GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT 
ENERGY STRATEGY 10 (2007), https://www.gov.nu.ca/sites/default/files/ 
ikummatiit_energy_strategy_english.pdf (stating the strategy is to “encourage the 
adoption of energy conservation and efficiency”).  
 40.  ENERGY STRATEGY FOR YUKON, supra note 39, at 16; NUNAVUT ENERGY 
STRATEGY, supra note 39, at 15 (2007). 
 41.  Hayes, supra note 18.  
 42.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 43.  See GOV’T OF NW. TERRITORIES, ENV’T & NAT. RES., NWT BIOMASS ENERGY 
STRATEGY 1 (2010). 
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B.  Alaska 
Many rural communities in Alaska also rely primarily on diesel 
generators for power. Alaska ranked second only to Hawaii in the United 
States for its share of electricity generated by diesel generators.44 Even 
though Alaska’s population is the fourth smallest in the United States, the 
state’s per capita energy use is third in the country due to the cold winters 
and energy-intensive industry.45 Rural communities in the state have no 
access to a grid and instead derive power from “rural power providers,” 
primarily using diesel electricity generators.46 In the larger communities 
in Alaska, natural gas is the primary power source, accounting for half of 
Alaska’s power generation, with hydroelectric and petroleum liquids 
each making up a fifth of the power supply.47 Wind and wind-diesel 
hybrid programs are emerging in some rural communities throughout the 
state.48 Additionally, biomass fuels, such as wood, wood pellets, and fish 
oil are important renewable energy resources for Alaska.49 
For rural communities, diesel-generated power plants are “the 
heart” of the power grid.50 The size of these plants varies from small 
thirty-five kilowatt generators to large 1.5 megawatt generators in the 
larger communities.51 Purchasing and storing fuel in these communities 
is typically very costly, as many of these communities must barge in diesel 
or even fly in fuel on tanker planes.52 Many communities further suffer 
costs because they only receive a single delivery of fuel each year.53 All of 
these factors create extremely high energy costs.54 In 2015, the average 
cost of a kilowatt/hour in rural Alaska was forty-nine cents, almost five 
times the national average.55 
 
 44.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Alaska State Energy Profile, 
http://www.eia.gov/state/print.cfm?sid=AK (last updated Oct. 19, 2017). The 
Energy Information Administration report uses “petroleum liquids” rather than 
diesel generators. Id. 
 45.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Alaska: Profile and Energy Estimates: Profile 
Analysis, https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=AK (last updated Oct. 
19, 2017). 
 46.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  ALASKA ENERGY AUTH., RENEWABLE ENERGY ATLAS OF ALASKA 16 (2013). 
 49.  Id. at 6. 
 50.  Alaska Center for Energy and Power UAF, Diesel Power Plants, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=liDUS39r2xs&feature= 
youtu.be. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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Due to the high energy costs in both Alaska and Canada, rural 
communities are turning to renewable sources to supplement their diesel 
energy generation and reduce this heavy burden. In fact, twenty-one 
small-scale wind farms now exist or are in development, primarily along 
the Bering Sea coast.56 Many of these projects have been funded, in part, 
by the Renewable Energy Grant, which supplies $50 million a year until 
2023 to “develop renewable energy projects across the state, particularly 
in areas with the highest energy costs.”57 Even with this progress, the 
technical, financial, regulatory, and community barriers to making these 
changes remain vast. However, these challenges must be addressed 
individually if rural community energy projects ever hope to generate 
momentum in western Alaska. 
 
II.  BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS TO COMMUNITY ENERGY  
PROJECTS IN THE RURAL ARCTIC 
 
One might think that the high costs of fuel, as well as the social costs 
of dirty diesel generators, would push rural communities to find 
alternative energy solutions much more quickly than what is actually 
occurring. However, the expense of transitioning to alternative sources of 
energy and the remoteness of these communities has made change slow 
for many Alaskan and Canadian villages. First, technology for efficient 
microgrid systems powered by solar and wind technology is relatively 
new and has not been implemented until recently. In fact, failed first 
generation technology that was used in some rural communities has 
damaged public opinion on renewable energy, making it harder for 
projects to engender community support.58 Yet, efficient new 
technologies developed by organizations like the Arctic Remote Energy 
Networks Academy (ARENA), the University of Alaska-Fairbanks’ 
energy consortium, have made huge strides to overcome the climatic and 
remoteness problems for community renewables.59  
 
 56.  ALASKA ENERGY AUTH., supra note 48, at 18. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  A good example of this is the wind projects in Nunavut in the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s. The wind technology twenty years ago was not nearly as efficient 
as it is today. However, these rural communities are wary of the risks of new 
renewable energy experiments. See Gov’t of Nunavut, Wind Resources, 
IKUMMATIIT, http://www.nunavutenergy.ca/en/node/18 (last visited Jan. 26, 
2018).  
 59.  See Arctic Remote Energy Networks Academy, 2017 Brochure, 
http://arena.alaska.edu/media/92134/arena-brochure_web.pdf [hereinafter 
ARENA 2017 Brochure] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (describing ARENA’s 
renewable energy education and outreach program for Arctic communities). 
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Now, the technology has become viable, technologically and 
financially, for many of these communities.60 It has thus become 
important to create efficient ways to help rural communities invest in 
their infrastructure to reduce energy costs in the future. In Alaska, the 
native corporations set up by ANCSA, with their statutory mandate to 
provide for the general welfare of their shareholders, are a promising 
institutional framework to channel money back to the villages.61 In 
Canada and Alaska, non-profit organizations like the AEA can also play 
a vital role—empowering rural villages to take charge of their own 
destiny by working hand-in-hand with community leaders and tribal 
councils to build systems tailored to their specific community’s needs.62 
This section, however, considers some of those financial barriers to 
community energy projects, including the initial capital funding, 
financing, and eventual collecting on the investment after system 
installation.63 Both initial funding and collection have been barriers to 
these types of rural energy projects not just in the Arctic, but around the 
developing world.64 Projects like the Solar Electric Light Company in 
India have made financing and collection easier for companies looking to 
invest in rural communities.65 This section will also look at Alaska’s 2017 
property assessed clean energy (PACE) legislation, which is intended to 
serve as a financing mechanism for rural energy projects.66 While this is 
not an exhaustive list of the different types of funding mechanisms that 
could be used for rural energy projects in the Arctic,67 these programs are 
a good place for energy policymakers to start as they can all be easily 
implemented at a minimal cost to state or local governments. 
Another major hidden cost to these projects, especially in the United 
States, is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),68 which requires 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See infra Part III.A. 
 62.  See infra Part III.C. 
 63.  As promising as investment by ANCs is for future renewable energy 
projects in Alaska, the for-profit nature of these corporations may be a stumbling 
block because many of these projects may not provide the highest return on 
investment for ANCs. See infra Part III.A. 
 64.  Richard L. Ottinger & John Bowie, Innovative Financing for Renewable 
Energy, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 701, 702 (2015) (arguing that funding in the 
developing world for renewable energy projects is hampered by high transaction 
costs, limited return on investment, high initial investment, and lack of long-term 
data on successful projects). 
 65.  See infra Part II.B. 
 66.  See H.B. 80, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017). 
 67.  For a more exhaustive list of potential funding mechanisms, see Richard 
Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64.  
 68.  Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853–54 (1970) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012)).  
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an Environmental Impact Statement for any “major federal action.”69 
While many traditional energy producers have received various shortcuts 
to streamline the NEPA process, renewables still must incur the full cost 
of NEPA analysis for any project involving federal action.70 If the federal 
government updated NEPA to allow for a more streamlined clean energy 
policy approach, renewable energy projects in Alaska would likely have 
a better chance of success.71 Even making small changes to NEPA to allow 
monitors more discretion to require follow-up analysis, rather than 
through rigorous initial viability studies as Canada’s Environmental 
Assessment Act does, could help get energy projects off the ground 
instead of tied up in legal purgatory for years.72 
Finally, the last major barrier to community energy projects in the 
Arctic is community involvement. Getting communities to be active in the 
implementation of these projects is essential to their long-term success. 
Projects fade quickly without strong community support, especially due 
to the harsh conditions in the Arctic.73 However, the cooperative nature 
of many native villages, with the local council and the village native 
corporation, could be a potential source of community support, much like 
the cooperative wind farms in Wales and Scotland have been a success in 
close-knit rural communities.74 
With strong leadership and awareness of the potential challenges of 
generating economically viable and long-lasting energy projects 
throughout the Arctic, the transition to alternative energy sources is more 
than possible. To work towards this goal, policymakers at every level of 
government must bring down these barriers so that community energy 
projects can be successful throughout Arctic communities to provide 
clean power for future generations. 
 
 69.  See infra Part II.C. 
 70.  Irma S. Russel, Streamlining NEPA to Combat Global Climate Change: Heresy 
or Necessity?, 39 ENVTL. L. 1049, 1049 (2009). 
 71.  Id. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 929 
(2002) (contrasting NEPA’s “one-time-only comprehensive prediction 
requirement” with the ability of corporate CEOs to “constantly reevaluate and 
revise plans and strategies as conditions change”). 
 72.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 949 (describing the “Monitoring and 
Central Coordination” process under Canada’s Environmental Assessment Act). 
 73.  See Steven M. Hoffman & Angela High-Pippert, From Private Lives to 
Collective Action: Recruitment and Participation Incentives for a Community Energy 
Program, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 7567, 7573 (2010) (concluding that the successful energy 
programs researched in the paper had at least some community engagement). 
 74.  See Gordon Walker, What are the Barriers and Incentives for Community-
Owned Means of Energy Production and Use?, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 4401, 4403 (2008) 
(describing the Baywind cooperative wind farm in Scotland and future projects 
based on Baywind). 
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A.  Technical Problems and Viability 
Before even considering financial, organizational, or community 
barriers, renewable energy projects must be technically viable. Without 
the development of technology that can overcome the challenges of 
extreme weather, inaccessibility to the grid, and limited access to 
technical and maintenance assistance, renewable energy projects in the 
Arctic would not be viable.75 While the technical science is outside the 
bounds of this Note, microgrid technology76 and other innovative new 
power sources, like solar-diesel systems, are in operation and are reliable 
enough to be used in the extreme Arctic environment.77 And as these 
technologies continue to become more efficient, it is important that our 
regulatory system likewise adapts to encourage, rather than inhibit, the 
growth of microgrid technology worldwide.78 This section of the Note 
will describe microgrid technology in general, and then describe the work 
of ARENA, headquartered at the University of Alaska-Fairbanks, to 
consider how this technology can be implemented in the Arctic. 
Microgrids are based on the concept of distributed generation, 
referring “to the production of electricity by a small-scale source located 
at or very near the end users it serves.”79 While these grids commonly are 
used as supplements to the existing power grid, they can also exist off-
grid.80 A major benefit of microgrids is that they allow real-time 
management of electric resources by end users.81 The final visions of the 
microgrid concept take this real-time management to the individual user, 
creating a peer-to-peer system for power distribution that can exist 
without any central distribution network.82 Nationally, the optimization 
of microgrid systems is headed by the Consortium for Electric Reliability 
 
 75.  See supra Part I for a more detailed description of the climate and 
circumstances in northern Canada and Alaska. 
 76.  See generally S. Chowdhury et al., Microgrids and Active Distribution 
Networks, INST. ENG’G & TECH. (2009) (describing microgrid technology as a 
potential solution for sustainable, energy-efficient growth designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). 
 77.  See ARENA 2017 Brochure, supra note 59; Colville Lake, supra note 7. 
 78.  See, e.g., Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 547, 565–74 (2010) (describing the barriers to microgrid technology 
throughout United States’ jurisdictions). 
 79.  Id. at 559. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  In fact, one Dutch company has created a system that allows end users to 
look at their energy usage in real time. See Smart Energy, QURRENT, 
https://www.qurrent.nl/slim-met-energie (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). This could 
be especially useful for remote villages who can manage their energy use together 
using tracking software like Qurrent. 
 82.  See R.H. Lasseter, Microgrids and Distributed Generation, 133 J. ENERGY 
ENG’G 144, 146 (2007) (describing the concept of a peer-to-peer network grid). 
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Technology Solutions (CERTS).83 CERTS was formed to promote 
transmission reliability for the American electrical grid as the country 
moves away from centrally planned utilities to a more distributed power 
network.84 To facilitate this transition, CERTS works with industry and 
research institutes to ensure grid reliability while supporting competitive 
markets for distributed energy generators.85 CERTS’ mission is to 
“provide microgrid functionality . . . at much lower costs than traditional 
approaches by incorporating peer-to-peer and plug-and-play concepts for 
each component within the microgrid.”86 These cost saving measures are 
not exclusive to microgrid systems in big cities tied to the grid; microgrids 
in small, rural communities can experience cost savings as well. 
In Alaska, ARENA’s mission is similar to that of CERTS nationally: 
developing microgrid technologies that will work in the extreme climes 
of the Arctic.87 The program is endorsed by not only the United States, but 
also Finland, Iceland, the Gwich’in Council International, and the Aleut 
International Association.88 In fact, the program collaborates with other 
renewable energy groups throughout the Arctic, including the AEA, to 
work on developing microgrids and other electricity systems for rural 
Arctic communities.89 However, one of the biggest differences between 
ARENA and CERTS is the former’s focus on community outreach and 
education. While CERTS holds technical symposia for engineers and 
experts in microgrid and distributed energy technology,90 ARENA has 
short webinars and on-site education programs designed to teach village 
community leaders the hands-on benefits of these programs in order to 
help build community support.91 This webinar series teaches community 
 
 83.  Distributed Energy Resource Microgrids, CONSORTIUM FOR ELECTRIC 
RELIABILITY TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, https://certs.lbl.gov/research-areas/ 
distributed-energy-resource-0 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) [hereinafter CERTS].  
 84.  About CERTS, CONSORTIUM FOR ELECTRIC RELIABILITY TECHNOLOGY 
SOLUTIONS, https://certs.lbl.gov/about-certs (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).  
 85.  Id. 
 86.  CERTS, supra note 83.  
 87.  See ARENA 2017 Brochure, supra note 59. 
 88.  ARENA Home Page, ALASKA REMOTE ENERGY NETWORKS ACADEMY, 
http://arena.alaska.edu/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
 89.  Team Collaborators, ALASKA REMOTE ENERGY NETWORKS ACADEMY, 
http://arena.alaska.edu/team/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). In fact, George Roe, 
ARENA’s technical lead for the Alaska Center for Energy and Power, was a 
speaker at the Arctic Energy Summit that took place in Helsinki in September 
2017, underscoring the international nature of the ARENA program. See Speakers, 
INSTITUTE OF THE NORTH, THE ARCTIC ENERGY SUMMIT, http://arcticenergysummit. 
com/speakers?max=100&sort=title&order=asc (last visited Mar. 23, 2018).  
 90.  See CERTS, supra note 83 (describing the dates of symposia and the hyper-
technical papers associated with these events). 
 91.  About ARENA Webinar Series, ALASKA REMOTE ENERGY NETWORKS 
ACADEMY, http://arena.alaska.edu/webinars/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).  
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leaders about the current reliability and efficiency of these technologies 
when compared to historical project failures, which have left many 
communities leery of new technology in the largely traditional, 
subsistence-driven villages.92 ARENA even goes further with community 
outreach by creating on-site programs where around twenty people 
participate in a nine-month program to educate Arctic community leaders 
on how to develop community-scale renewable energy initiatives.93 This 
program has also included visits to Yellowknife, Fairbanks, and 
Reykjavik, Iceland throughout the nine months to see how different 
communities approach renewable energy projects in the Arctic.94 These 
community outreach programs not only enrich the individuals who 
participate in them but also the communities they serve and the 
circumpolar community as a whole in an effort to “move towards our 
shared goal of a sustainable future.”95 
B.  Innovative Financing Mechanisms to Overcome Financial 
Barriers 
Property Assessed Clean Energy Programs 
 
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs, which are a 
relatively new and innovative form of financing for clean energy projects, 
have quickly become controversial.96 Many of the original PACE 
programs encouraged homeowners to invest in renewable energy 
projects, such as solar panels, because they allowed for long repayment 
periods and low interest rates compared to a traditional loan.97 Originally, 
municipalities enacted PACE programs modeled after an enabling statute 
passed by the state legislature.98 While the basic structure of these laws 
 
 92.  For more information on this topic, ARENA has a webinar series for all of 
the particular technical systems involved in diesel power generation, renewable 
resources, and the ability to combine the two. Id. 
 93.  See ARENA 2017 Brochure, supra note 59. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  See Michael A. Wrapp, Note, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE): 
Victim of Loan Giants or Way of the Future?, 27 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
273, 276 (2013); see also Jeffrey Hoops, Note, Setting the Pace for Energy Efficiency: 
The Rise, Fall, and (Potential) Return of Property Assessed Clean Energy, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 901, 901 (2012); Ian M. Larson, Note, Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage 
Lenders Halt Local Clean Energy Programs, 76 MO. L. REV. 599, 599 (2010). 
 97.  Jason R. Weiner & Christian Alexander, On-Site Renewable Energy and 
Public Finance: How and Why Municipal Bond Financing is the Key to Propagating 
Access to On-Site Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 26 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 559, 574 (2010). 
 98.  Jonathan B. Wilson, Maura A. Marcheski & Elias B. Hinckley, The Great 
PACE Controversy: Renewable Energy Financing Program Hits a Snag, 25 PROB. & 
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has not changed, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s rejection of housing 
mortgages burdened by residential PACE loans has changed the focus of 
these programs to commercial and smaller scale residential assessments 
in order to receive federal underwriting.99 This second wave of PACE 
projects now encompasses seventeen states and the District of Columbia, 
with another fourteen states currently in the process of enacting PACE-
enabling legislation.100 This section describes how PACE programs work, 
examines the legal challenges to PACE programs and the effect this has 
had on state PACE programs, and then considers the recently passed 
Alaska PACE legislation and proposes some changes that could make the 
program more attractive to rural native Alaskan populations.101 
PACE programs allow local governments to offer property owners 
low-interest loans in exchange for capital improvements relating to 
energy efficiency on their property.102 These property owners then repay 
the loan through additional property-tax assessments by the 
municipality.103 United States Congressmen Henry Waxman and Barney 
Frank praised these programs for allowing property owners to make 
expensive capital improvements without incurring upfront costs.104 
Furthermore, these tax assessments run with the property, dispelling 
property owners’ concerns that loan repayment requirements will restrict 
any transfer of the property.105 Additionally, these assessments take the 
form of government liens against the property that become senior to the 
primary mortgage against the house, reducing the securities risks for 
banks making these loans and reducing the interest rates on the PACE 
loans.106 Essentially, these programs allow property owners to make 
improvements on their house, saving the owner in energy costs without 
the large initial investment costs.107 
As PACE programs were adopted by many states and local 
governments, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) became 
increasingly concerned about the seniority of these liens relative to the 
primary mortgages, stating that PACE loans “present a significant risk to 
lenders and secondary market entities” and that the FHFA will place 
 
PROP. 38, 39 (2011). 
 99.  See Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case Against Property Assessed Clean 
Energy Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 83, 117–18 (2011). 
 100.  PACE Programs Near You, PACENATION, http://pacenation.us/pace-
programs/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).  
 101.  See H.B. 80, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017). 
 102.  See Wilson et al., supra note 98, at 38. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 39. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See Wrapp, supra note 96, at 277. 
 107.  Id. 
35.1 STRAND (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2018  7:51 PM 
2018 RENEWABLE ENERGY IN THE ARCTIC 83 
severe restrictions on these types of senior liens.108 This decision led to 
challenges against municipal PACE programs in jurisdictions across the 
country, resulting in waves of PACE litigation. 
After the FHFA’s decision to restrict Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
from underwriting housing loans burdened with PACE liens, the 
municipal PACE programs were decimated.109 In response, many NGOs 
and municipalities sued seeking declaratory relief, arguing that PACE 
liens are “assessments” rather than “loans” and enjoining the restrictions 
FHFA had placed on PACE liens.110 All of these initial cases alleged 
violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and NEPA due to FHFA’s 
broad and unilateral decision to exclude PACE-burdened liens without 
any public notice and comment or environmental analysis.111 The circuit 
courts that have ruled on PACE challenges, however, have either vacated 
district court rulings112 or dismissed the lawsuits, holding that FHFA’s 
unilateral action was within its authority as conservator of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008.113 Furthermore, the courts ruled that vacating any district court’s 
decision would not even redress the plaintiffs’ problems since the banks 
undertaking these loans could voluntarily back out at any time.114 
Subsequently, FHFA stopped its informal rulemaking process altogether 
and relied instead on these courts’ holdings in support of its decision not 
to underwrite PACE liens.115 
 
 108.  Statement, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy 
Retrofit Loan Programs (July 6, 2010), https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/ 
PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Statement-on-Certain-Energy-Retrofit-Loan-
Programs.aspx; see also Cox, supra note 99, at 103 (stating “that mortgages that 
originated in a jurisdiction with a PACE program would be subject to significant 
restrictions”). 
 109.  See Wrapp, supra note 96, at 285 (describing the negative impact of 
restrictions imposed by FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac). 
 110.  See, e.g., Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 790 F. Supp. 2d 47 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2012); Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 815 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Town 
of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2012); People ex rel. 
Harris v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2012), vacated 
sub nom. Cty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 111.  See Wrapp, supra note 96, at 287–94 for a more in-depth look at these 
cases. 
 112.  Cty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 113.  Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Leon Cty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 114.  See Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 230 (“Nothing in the OCC Bulletin 
compelled national banks to take any action. The Bulletin is labeled ‘Supervisory 
Guidance,’ and is couched in entirely permissive language.”). 
 115.  While never codified, the proposed rule advocated for stricter 
underwriting standards as a way to protect banks and mortgage-holders from the 
secondary loan in the form of a PACE bill. See Enterprise Underwriting Standards, 
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However, since these initial setbacks, more narrowly tailored 
legislation has been affirmed in state courts, even when the seniority of 
the lien was called into question.116 After the demise of the initial PACE 
programs, many states rebooted their PACE programs to address the 
FHFA concerns. One solution that the FHFA has backed is PACE liens 
that are junior to primary mortgages.117 In fact, the Department of Energy 
released a “best practices” guide in 2016 that recommended a number of 
changes to state PACE legislation, including stricter underwriting 
standards, tighter restrictions on qualifying projects, more transparent 
fees and information to consumers, and notification of mortgage holders 
when a PACE lien is taken out.118 Additionally, some critics of the early 
PACE laws have called for lower ceilings on PACE loans to put them on 
par with traditional tax assessments, as well as for the creation of fees 
designed to lessen the administrative burden PACE liens put on local 
governments.119 Finally, some states have focused on commercial 
buildings, which tend to be less risky for mortgage holders and have been 
wildly successful.120 Texas, for example, has created an open market 
system for PACE loans headed by a non-profit that some of its major 
counties and cities have adopted over the past three years.121 
Notwithstanding prior setbacks, PACE programs have proven 
successful in incentivizing homeowners to invest in clean energy 
technology. In particular, PACE programs have increased community 
involvement in clean energy technologies and increased access to these 
technologies that were once out of reach for many lower-income 
households.122 This increase in community involvement could mean that 
 
77 Fed. Reg. 36,086 (proposed June 15, 2012) (the rule was not adopted). 
 116.  See Erin L. Deady, Property Assessed Clean Energy: Is There Finally a Clear 
Path To Success?, 90 FLA. BUS. J. 114 (2016) (discussing recent court cases upholding 
the Florida PACE legislation against creditors in the residential context); see also 
Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. Fla. Dev. Fin. Corp., 176 So.3d 1258 (Fla. 2015) (limiting the 
scope of the Florida Development Finance Corporation, but upholding the 
assessment process in the PACE legislation). 
 117.  See Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 728–29 (describing the Vermont 
PACE program); see also Wrapp, supra note 96, at 295–96 (including Maine, 
Oklahoma, and New Hampshire as other states that have made PACE liens junior 
to mortgages). 
 118.  See generally U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR 
RESIDENTIAL PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS (2016), https://www.energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/2016/11/f34/best-practice-guidelines-RPACE.pdf. 
 119.  See Cox, supra note 99, at 116. 
 120.  See Where is PACE?, TEXAS PACE AUTHORITY (2017), https://www.texas 
paceauthority.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See Cox, supra note 99 (finding that even in families that did not ultimately 
use PACE as a way to fund energy projects, the homeowners credited PACE with 
their decision to invest in solar power privately). But see Wrapp, supra note 96, at 
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PACE programs are not just important as programs designed to finance 
clean energy, but are also important as a way to encourage the community 
as a whole to participate in clean energy reform. Additionally, the Texas 
open market model could be an effective system for poorer, rural 
communities that cannot afford the administrative costs associated with 
a PACE system that includes government assistance at the lending and 
contracting phase.123 Unfortunately, federal support for PACE, which was 
once championed by President Obama and Vice President Biden,124 has 
been rolled back in the Trump administration, and federal programs to 
insure some homes with PACE loans have been eliminated.125 
The Alaska Legislature passed House Bill 80, which adopted PACE 
legislation for Alaska in 2017.126 However, the law is severely limited 
because only “municipalities” could adopt its provisions, which enables 
only larger communities in the state to implement the program and 
restricts the use of PACE programs in Alaska’s many unincorporated 
villages.127 Further restricting the applicability of this legislation for rural 
communities is the limitation of PACE loans to commercial or industrial 
properties.128 Rural communities normally have few commercial or 
industrial buildings that would qualify under this law. However, the 
program also includes parts of the open market model, allowing for third 
party financing while also allowing for additional funding through 
municipal bonds.129 The law also requires application fees on the part of 
 
281–82 (noting that PACE programs can only be used by property owners and 
that poor local governments do not have the administrative funds to support 
PACE programs). 
 123.  Under the Texas model, owners are able to choose their source of private 
capital, reducing transaction costs for individual counties. See What is PACE?, 
TEXAS PACE AUTHORITY, https://www.texaspaceauthority.org/what-is-pace/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2018); Local Government FAQ, TEXAS PACE AUTHORITY, 
https://www.texaspaceauthority.org/resources/faqs/local-government-faq/ 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2018).  
 124.  See THE WHITE HOUSE, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PACE FINANCING 
PROGRAMS (2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/ 
PACE_Principles.pdf (supporting use of federal funds for pilot programs of PACE 
financing). 
 125.  See U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., Mortgagee Letter 2017-18 4 (Dec. 7, 
2017), https://www.housingwire.com/ext/resources/files/Editorial/ 
HUD-PACE-letter.pdf.  
 126.  See H.B. 80, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017) (“authorizing municipalities 
to establish programs to impose assessments for energy improvements in regions 
designated by municipalities; imposing fees; and providing for an effective date”). 
 127.  See id. at 3, 11 (restricting application of the law to “home rule and general 
law municipalities”). 
 128.  Id. at 3. 
 129.  Id. at 4. 
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the property owner, which can increase the transparency of the program 
while providing funds to alleviate the administrative burden.130 
Improvements to the new law to better support rural communities 
going forward, however, are reasonable and achievable. First, the 
legislature could act to provide subsidies and incentives at the state level 
for lenders to invest in rural communities.131 This could be achieved 
through public-private partnerships with native corporations and the 
village corporations, emphasizing the community nature of PACE 
funding and its ability to help communities as a whole.132 PACE programs 
can also be used in conjunction with the other financing mechanisms, 
discussed below, to create a comprehensive community energy plan.133 
Furthermore, the risks created by the PACE system could be dispersed 
across the entire community in the form of a “system charge,” lowering 
lender risk and interest rates.134 
While these suggestions are relatively major changes to the current 
law, implementing these more inclusive structures would offer native 
corporations and their shareholders a better opportunity to participate in 
PACE as one piece of a comprehensive community energy plan using 
many financing techniques. 
Margin Money Financing 
 
Apart from PACE programs, other alternative loan structures exist 
throughout the developing world to help alleviate the burden of the initial 
upfront cost of energy improvements.135 One solution that has proven 
 
 130.  Id.; see also Cox, supra note 99, at 116–17 (arguing in favor of a direct fee to 
program participants to increase transparency in costs and funding); Wrapp, 
supra note 96, at 300 (arguing that greater transparency in costs and funding, via 
direct fees, would make participation in the program more appealing). 
 131.  See Cox, supra note 99, at 116 (suggesting that private financing, contractor 
services, and “the like” might feel encouraged by government-sanctioned offers 
for energy investment). 
 132.  Weiner & Alexander, supra note 97, at 583 (“PACE financing arguably 
enhances the tax base of a community through higher property values.”). 
 133.  See Cox, supra note 99, at 120 (“A small loan PACE program might be 
especially effective if it could be quickly broadened to reach more people by 
combining it with a series of other highly targeted government mandates and 
services.”). 
 134.  See id. at 121 (arguing in favor of a “system charge” to all utility customers 
to fund a partial rebate of the costs for purchasing energy-saving equipment). This 
type of dispersal could also be combined with the prepaid meter approach, infra 
Part II.B, to reduce the transaction costs for lenders dealing with small rural 
villages. 
 135.  See generally Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 67 (describing various 
innovative financing schemes that have been used throughout the developing 
world). 
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successful in India is margin money financing.136 Essentially, margin 
money financing helps homeowners seeking to borrow money who can 
make the term payments on a project loan but are unable to afford the 
down payment.137 Margin money financing makes up the difference by 
supplying a loan for the down payment.138 Historically, these were 
government-sponsored programs due to the high risk of default.139 But as 
climate change becomes a more serious issue, think tanks and other 
groups have recommended funding in the “undersupplied” areas, 
including “households . . . wishing to invest in slightly more capital 
intensive but energy efficient buildings.”140 Most importantly, however, 
“margin money financing bootstraps investment, as new owners use the 
benefit of their first installation to purchase additional units [of green 
power generation] under their own financing.”141 
One particular success story for this program was in the small Indian 
weaving village of Doddaullarthi.142 To provide electricity to the village, 
the Solar Electric Light Company (SELCO), launched a margin money 
financing program in 2008 to provide lighting to the village in order to 
allow weavers to work after sundown.143 SELCO had partnered with 
regional rural banks and microfinancing institutions to create the 
financing opportunities for the rural villages.144 SELCO’s margin money 
program bundles the margin financing into the primary loan, where the 
margin money typically amounts to between fifteen and twrnty-five 
 
 136.  See, e.g., SELCO, ACCESS TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SERVICES VIA INNOVATIVE 
FINANCING: 7 CASE STUDIES 8 (2008) [hereinafter SELCO CASE STUDY], 
http://www.selco-india.com/pdfs/selco_booklet_web.pdf (describing how an 
Indian village financed the purchase of solar lights through margin money 
financing). 
 137.  See Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 710 (describing the traditional loan 
structure of margin money financing); see also CHRIS GROOBEY ET AL., PROJECT 
FINANCE PRIMER FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND CLEAN TECH PROJECTS (2010), 
https://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/ctp_guide.pdf (describing the importance 
of project finance to investments in the clean technology sector and emerging 
markets).  
 138.  Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 710. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Thomas Spencer et al., Mapping Issues and Options on Climate Finance in 
2015 (Inst. for Sustainable Dev. and Int’l Relations, Working Paper No. 08/15, 
2015), http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/ 
WP0815_TS%20et%20al._finance%20climate%20agreement.pdf. 
 141.  Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 710. 
 142.  See SELCO CASE STUDY, supra note 136 (describing how the community 
financed and purchased solar lights). 
 143.  Id. at 4–5. 
 144.  See Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 711 (describing how SELCO 
worked with a variety of financial institutions to support its margin money 
program). 
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percent of the loan.145 Essentially, SELCO provides a down payment on 
the project and allows the village to make the payments as they begin to 
see increased efficiency and productivity because of the improvements.146 
This financing scheme also matches repayment to the savings achieved 
by the renewable energy assets, to reduce the risk for banks and 
governments who underwrite these loans.147 
Margin money financing could also be a beneficial strategy for North 
American Arctic villages who are looking at renewable financing 
measures. Like India, many Arctic villages rely on diesel generators for 
their power. Furthermore, in Alaska, native corporations could be a 
bridge between government-sponsored programs and renewable 
resources contractors in the same way microfinance and regional rural 
banks facilitated the margin money financing for SELCO in India. 
Amortizing measures, like those SELCO has used to tie payments to 
energy cost savings realized as a result of renewable energy assets, could 
further dispel concerns of default.148 Likewise, limiting the amount of 
margin money financing to less than fifteen percent of the total loan 
would reduce the risk to lenders in the same way that limiting the value 
of PACE loans has reduced the risk for those financing measures.149 While 
margin money financing is a new and relatively unknown financing 
measure, the unique position that Alaska’s native corporations can play 
as a public-private partner with native village shareholders could make 
this system administratively and financially feasible. 
Subsidized Capital Funding 
 
Third, while direct funding may not be innovative, it is a critical part 
of the funding scheme for many large-scale energy projects. Direct 
funding has already been implemented in Alaska for renewable projects, 
but has not been used in conjunction with the other funding mechanisms 
described above.150 Indeed, the Alaska Energy Authority has funded over 
$257 million worth of projects though its Renewable Energy Fund since 
 
 145.  See also SELCO CASE STUDY, supra note 136, at 2. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 712. 
 148.  See id. (“By amortizing initial costs, margin money financing matches 
repayment to the long-term income producing nature of renewable energy 
assets.”). 
 149.  See id.; SELCO CASE STUDY, supra note 136; see also supra Part II.B for a look 
at successful solutions to the PACE financing program. 
 150.  See, e.g., Brashear supra note 16 (reporting that the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Rural Development agency in 2016 issued $16 million in federal 
grants to fund energy projects in Alaskan communities).  
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2008.151 However, the Alaska Energy Authority has not received any 
funds from the state government since 2015 because of the State’s current 
fiscal challenges.152 To make subsidized capital funding more effective 
when the State has less money to invest, Alaska should follow the model 
of organizations like the AEA. The AEA provides funding not only based 
on objective factors, such as technical viability and the availability of 
matching funds, but also subjective factors about the level of community 
engagement in the project. There is a need to ensure the community can 
support the energy project after it has been installed and the technicians 
leave for the winter.153 Organizations like Alaska Native Corporations 
(ANCs) could play a role in an effective subsidized funding scheme, 
acting as a funnel for government funds already earmarked to help 
Alaskan villages. 
However, to make subsidized capital funding effective, the 
regulations and conditions on the money given to the ANCs needs to be 
minimal, so that the ANCs can use their ability to quickly react to the 
market by changing programs that are not working.154 In Alaska, village 
corporations could function like municipal power cooperatives, 
managing the energy projects on the ground and working with regional 
corporations to quickly react to problems with the current system.155 
Regional native corporations could act as project managers, changing the 
scope of the project depending on the success and progress made by the 
village corporation.156 This integrated approach to subsidized funding 
allows for greater efficiency than a traditional government-led approach, 
resulting in lower bills, and additionally empowers community members 
to select the renewable power sources that they believe would be best for 
them.157 Funding should also be allocated to the Alaska Energy Authority, 
 
 151.  ALASKA ENERGY AUTH., Renewable Energy Fund Status Report 2 (Jan. 2018), 
http://www.akenergyauthority.org/Portals/0/Programs/RenewableEnergyFu
nd/Documents/2018-REF%20Status%20Report.1.27.18.pdf.   
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes (describing the process the 
AEA uses to select projects); infra Part III.D (describing the need for community 
engagement in project design). 
 154.  See infra Part II.C for an in-depth look at some regulatory barriers to 
funding alternative energy projects. 
 155.  This type of distribution has been called Community Choice Aggregation 
and has been used to encourage local choice for renewable energy projects, which 
can help not only with initial community support but also subsequent support of 
the program. See Paul Fenn & Samuel Golding, COMMUNITY CHOICE AGGREGATION 
2.0: STRATEGIES FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES IN CCA ENVIRONMENTS, at 5–6 
(2004), http://localpower.com/whitepaperCopyright2011byLocalPowerInc.pdf 
(using California CCAs as examples of the distribution’s success).  
 156.  See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes for a more in-depth 
discussion about the relationships between regional and village corporations. 
 157.  See Ottinger & Bowie supra note 64, at 752–53. Programs like this have 
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especially based on its success in promoting renewable energy projects 
over the last ten years.158 By partnering with ANCs to provide funding for 
projects, the State may be able to ensure more matching funds than are 
available through the Alaska Energy Authority, whose projects have 
stalled without consistent government funding since 2015.159 
Whenever new technology is developed to protect a common good, 
government funding is a critical piece of the equation. However, 
traditional government funding has proven too slow and unresponsive to 
battle against climate change.160 Instead, direct funding through 
organizations like the AEA or ANCs allows for a quick response to 
changing conditions. Additionally, this section has shown that this direct 
funding is only a small piece of the mosaic of funding programs that can 
be employed to work on renewable energy projects in remote Arctic 
villages. In the twenty-first century, we need to use technology and 
corporate structures together to efficiently spend the dollars we are 
throwing at renewable energy. 
Prepaid Meters—Billing at the Village Scale 
 
Some of the biggest problems with creating village-scale systems do 
not come from the initial funding of a renewable energy project, but 
collecting on that initial investment.161 This problem was exacerbated in 
the past by primitive and costly communication networks.162 However, 
modern communication and online payment methods have significantly 
decreased the logistical challenges and transaction costs for collecting 
 
already developed in some west coast states, resulting in increased funding in 
renewable energy resources. See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7567 
(outlining state and regional programs designed to encourage renewable energy 
investment such as the West Coast Governors’ Global Warming Initiative). 
 158.  See ALASKA ENERGY AUTH., supra note 151, at 2 (accounting for over 30 
million gallons of fuel displaced in 2016 alone, a savings of over $60 million). 
 159.  Id. (showing that projected fuel displacement will be relatively stagnant 
through 2019 without more state funding). 
 160.  See infra Part II.D for a more detailed look at community engagement. 
 161.  This threat has been identified primarily in sub-Saharan Africa but can be 
transported to any area where there is a significant disparity between the 
creditworthiness of the villagers and the wealth of the companies providing the 
energy programs. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE, FINANCING RENEWABLE 
ENERGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 42 (2012), www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/. . ./ 
Financing_Renewable_Energy_in_subSaharan_Africa.pdf. (“The poor 
creditworthiness is often explained by poor billing and payment collection 
systems, limited innovation, and prices that reflect neither costs nor demand, but 
are determined on political grounds.”).  
 162.  See id. (arguing that poor billing and payment collection systems in sub-
Saharan Africa contributed to the poor creditworthiness of state-owned utilities). 
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payments in remote locations.163 Importantly, these new “cloud billing” 
services can help electrical service providers and investors support 
remote village power systems without logistical problems or theft of 
power due to a lack of oversight by the power provider.164 Because of their 
remote location, village microgrids could fall victim to illegal “power 
theft, tampering with meters, or unauthorized splitting of electricity feed 
lines allowing electricity to be diverted to non-paying resident[s].”165 
One way to avoid power stealing is using a prepaid meter system 
that requires payment of electricity upfront, and shuts off when the 
credits expire, much like a parking meter.166 Furthermore, these systems 
operate in the cloud, reducing the cost of implementing the system.167 
These benefits make investing in renewable resources in remote villages 
more attractive to investors concerned about regular profit and lower 
risk.168 One company, in fact, has used prepaid meters in conjunction with 
cell phone apps and online bill pay to provide access to electricity in the 
developing world, providing energy to approximately half a million 
people worldwide.169 
Using this type of prepaid system in Alaska and the Northwest 
Territories may entice power investors to invest past the initial capital 
investment stage. While these systems are more typical in the developing 
world, the far north has similar characteristics, and the same problem 
with policing illegal activity, which make prepaid systems particularly 
attractive.170 Providing a cloud-based, pay-as-you-go system for energy 
 
 163.  See Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 720 (“Fortunately, advances in 
wireless communications, cloud accounting software, and the efforts of a variety 
of Internet startup companies are simplifying and securing the billing process.”). 
 164.  See Rene Sotola, Billing in the Cloud: The Missing Link for Cloud Providers, 3 
J. OF TELECOMM. MGMT. 313 (2011) (discussing the general advantages of cloud 
billing); see also James Grundvig, Detecting Power Theft by Sensors and the Cloud: 
Awesense Smart System for the Grid, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-grundvig/detecting-power-theft-by-
_b_3078082.html (describing a startup that sells mobile-cloud software to utilities 
to detect power theft and inefficiencies in the transmission lines).  
 165.  Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 721. 
 166.  See R.K. Pillai, Prepaid Electricity Meters and Issues Related to Implementation 
of Prepaid Metering Systems, ENERGY CENTRAL (July 26, 2005), 
http://www.energycentral.com/c/iu/prepaid-electricity-meters-and-issues-
related-implementation-prepaid-metering (explaining prepaid meters for 
electricity).  
 167.  Ottinger & Bowie, supra note 64, at 722. 
 168.  Cf. id. at 723 (stating that energy producers utilizing pre-paid meters 
would benefit by reductions in “arrears in accounts receivable and operation and 
financial costs”). 
 169.  See LUMETER NETWORKS, INC., http://www.lumeter.net/ (last visited Jan. 
23, 2018) (describing Lumeter’s “pay-as-you-go” business model). 
 170.  In Alaska, for example, one state trooper may be assigned to multiple 
villages hundreds of miles apart only accessible by bush plane in the summer or 
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would also encourage efficient energy use by consumers who would 
know their energy costs upfront. There is considerable concern that the 
seasonal extremes of the Arctic could make the system too draconian due 
to the harshness of shutting off an Arctic customer’s power in the dead of 
winter. However, the benefit of a system like this to investors, who could 
analyze their business decisions regarding the investment in real time, 
could be enough to entice new investors into the market.171 
Currently the biggest barrier to implementing prepaid metering in 
Alaska is access to reliable, affordable, broadband services.172 In fact, a 
2015 Federal Communications Report found that eighty-one percent of 
rural areas in Alaska had no access to broadband services.173 However, 
the FCC has made rural access to broadband a priority and has 
announced a billion dollars in subsidies to Alaska telecommunications 
companies to increase competition and access to high-speed broadband 
for rural communities.174 GCI, one of the largest telecommunications 
companies in Alaska, has used this money to construct the microwave 
Internet connections that now connect eighty-four villages throughout 
western rural Alaska.175 However, Internet connections in these villages 
are still very expensive with a speed of just six megabytes per second 
costing up to $149.99 per month.176 For comparison, twenty-five 
megabytes per second costs around $55 per month in New York City.177 
 
snow machine in the winter. 
 171.  Lumeter, for example, has been very successful as a for-profit company 
in this sector and is currently scaling to bigger production worldwide. See 
Lumeter Networks, Inc., Energy Maps, http://energymap-scu.org/lumeter-
networks-inc/ [https://perma.cc/ZWA9-MR34] (describing Lumeter’s 
expansion plans). 
 172.  Jeannette Lee Falsey, For rural Alaska broadband, the ‘middle mile’ is 
everything, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.adn.com/ 
features/business-economy/2017/03/18/for-rural-alaska-broadband-the-
middle-mile-is-everything/ (describing the monopoly that Alaska 
telecommunications company GCI has over rural internet and the resulting 
monopolistic price schemes). 
 173.  FEDERAL COMMC’NS COMM’N, BROADBAND AVAILABILITY IN AMERICA: WITH 
RURAL AMERICANS LOOKING FOR HIGH-SPEED SERVICES, ADEQUATE BRODBAND 
SPEEDS REMAIN OUT OF REACH FOR MANY 5 (Jan. 30, 2015), https://apps.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-331734A1.pdf.  
 174.  Tim Ellis, Feds Offer $1 Billion to Improve Broadband Access in Rural, Remote 
Alaskan Communities, KUAC (Sept. 9, 2016), http://fm.kuac.org/post/feds-offer-
1-billion-improve-broadband-access-rural-remote-alaskan-communities.  
 175.  Amy Nordrum, 109 Microwave Towers Bring the Internet to Remote Alaska 
Villages, IEEE Spectrum (Nov. 30, 2017, 6:14 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/ 
telecom/wireless/109-microwave-towers-bring-the-internet-to-remote-alaska-
villages. These connections range throughout western Alaska from Kotzebue to 
the Bristol Bay Region. See Falsey, supra note 172 (showing a map of the TERRA 
grid in western Alaska). 
 176.  Nordrum, supra note 175.  
 177.  Id. 
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With these price disparities, it is unlikely that prepaid metering excels as 
a payment mechanism in western Alaska. However, as competition for 
providing rural services increases among Alaskan telecommunications 
companies, this price may drop, making prepaid metering a smart 
solution for prudent investors.178 
C.  Regulatory Barriers: The National Environmental Policy Act and  
Canada’s Environmental Assessment Act 
Apart from technical and economic challenges, federal regulatory 
structures, such as NEPA,179 complicate communal ownership and 
impose barriers to growth of rural Alaskan villages.180 This section will 
describe the regulatory costs imposed by NEPA in the United States, and 
then briefly compare it to Canada’s Environmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA)181 to argue that NEPA should be modified to provide an 
emphasis on post-project reassessment over pre-project comprehensive 
assessments for alternative energy projects such as wind-diesel and solar 
projects. These changes to NEPA would adapt the nearly fifty-year-old 
statute to a system more in line with modern corporate structures, giving 









 178.  See Ellis, supra note 174 (reporting that other companies like the Arctic 
Slope Telephone Association Cooperative and the Alaska Telephone Company 
are looking to increase their networks as a result of the FCC subsidies). 
 179.  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2012)). 
 180.  See, e.g., Russel, supra note 70 (arguing for a streamlined approach to 
NEPA for “green” energy programs to have the same competitive advantage as 
conventional energy programs which have streamlined approaches as it stands); 
Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73 (describing the challenges to communal 
ownership posed by the current SEC regulations). 
 181.  In 2012, as part of an omnibus budget bill, the Canadian Parliament 
passed a sweeping change to the CEAA. Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52 [hereinafter CEAA 2012]. 
 182.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 929 (contrasting NEPA’s “one-time-only 
comprehensive prediction requirement” against corporate CEOs who “can 
constantly reevaluate and revise plans and strategies as conditions change”). 
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The National Environmental Policy Act 
 
NEPA has been hailed as “the Magna Carta of U.S. environmental 
law,”183 spawning sister statutes in numerous jurisdictions around the 
world.184 Nevertheless, NEPA has also been criticized as a procedurally 
driven disaster whose primary effect is to generate paperwork without 
any real impact.185 Despite the spotty results, NEPA nonetheless has 
forced agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of 
federal programs.186 
NEPA requires an environmental impact analysis whenever a 
federal agency undertakes a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment.”187 To sufficiently analyze a 
“major federal action,” the agency must prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS), which requires the agency to take a “hard look” 
at all the potential environmental effects.188 This nebulous standard 
creates incentives for agencies to avoid EIS statements by any means 
necessary, normally by preparing a preliminary Environmental 
Assessment, followed by a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) to 
avoid full-blown EIS analysis.189 This perverse incentive structure leads 
 
 183.  Ray Clark, NEPA: The Rational Approach to Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15, 15–16 (Ray Clark & Larry 
Canter eds., 1997); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS 3 (Jan. 1997) (“NEPA has been emulated by more than 25 states and over 
80 countries around the world, and serves as a model for environmental impact 
assessments . . . .”). 
 184.  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 183 (NEPA has been emulated in 
over 80 countries); see also Richard K. Morgan, Environmental Impact Assessment: 
The State of the Art, 30, No. 1 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 5, 5–6 
(2012) (describing how Canada, Australia, Sweden and New Zealand all have 
sister statutes and a number of international conventions contain similar planning 
conditions). 
 185.  See, e.g., Sally K. Fairfax, A Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 
SCIENCE 743, 743–45 (1978); Clark, supra note 183, at 23. 
 186.  Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 910. 
 187.  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
 188.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) 
(finding that a “hard look” was taken even if the mitigation measures for the 
proposed ski resort were not including a “worst case scenario”). But see Neighbors 
of Cuddy Mountain v. United States Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1378–81 (9th Cir. 
1998) (finding EIS did not contain sufficient detail regarding the cumulative 
impacts on the surrounding old growth forest); California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 
767–79 (9th Cir. 1982) (considering eleven alternatives was not sufficient because 
“obvious” alternatives were excluded). 
 189.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 909–10 (noting that roughly 50,000 EAs 
are prepared each year compared to 500 EISs). 
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federal agencies to prepare 50,000 Environmental Assessments that end 
in FONSIs.190 By contrast, only about 500 EISs are produced each year.191 
In the energy sector, cumbersome EIS statements can dissuade 
companies and investors from applying for federal permits to invest in 
new energy projects without a bulletproof EIS to avoid litigation.192 
Furthermore, because of the roughly thirty-three months it takes the 
Department of Energy to issue the average permit, streamlining is 
necessary to make alternative energy projects attractive for private 
investors and ANCs.193 For example, the Oil Shale, Tar Sands, and Other 
Strategic Unconventional Fuels Act of 2005 (the Unconventional Fuels 
Act) has streamlined the process for controversial hydrofracturing and tar 
sand refinement to let oil companies use the newly developed 
technology.194 The Unconventional Fuels Act even steps outside of NEPA, 
prioritizing land exchanges with land outside of shale basins,195 and 
requiring the Department of Interior “to coordinate and accelerate” the 
development of “oil shale and tar sands resources within the United 
States.”196 Finally, the Unconventional Fuels Act allows the Secretary of 
Energy to identify potential commercial production technologies for oil 
shale and tar sand oil production,197 and provide technical and cost-
sharing assistance to quickly implement the technology.198 All of these 
 
 190.  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 25TH 
ANNIVERSARY REPORT 51–52 (1996), https://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/ 
25th_ann.pdf. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 913 (outlining the costs of the NEPA 
process as including “costly and time-consuming lawsuits; disciplining 
congressional responses including budget reductions [for agencies], legislative 
amendments, or oversight hearings; and disciplining personnel, policy, or budget 
moves by the White House”); see also NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., MANAGING 
NEPA AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY III.B (1998), https://energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/G-Oth-Managing_NEPA_DOE.pdf (highlighting the need to 
bulletproof an EIS to avoid unnecessary litigation). 
 193.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 919 (describing the length of time an EIS 
requires); Russel, supra note 70, at 1052 (advocating for streamlining). 
 194.  See 42 U.S.C. § 15927(b) (2012) (justifying the streamlining on the basis of 
energy security “with an emphasis on sustainability”). Specifically, the 
Unconventional Fuels Act opened federal land to oil shale development, 
expanded the amount of acres a single leaseholder could develop, and required 
the Department of Interior to issue a Programmatic EIS for the entire oil shale 
leasing program. Id. § 15927. As Russell notes, “[t]ogether these regulations allow 
an agency to complete an EIS analysis on a relatively small section of land 
(perhaps a thousand acres), and then through adoption apply the results to tens 
or hundreds of thousands of additional acres.” Russell, supra note 70, at 1060. 
 195.  42 U.S.C. § 15927(n)(1). 
 196.  Id. § 15927(h)(1). 
 197.  Id. § 15927(l)(1). 
 198.  Id. § 15927(l)(2)(A), (C). Some oil and gas leases have been completely 
removed from NEPA analysis by using Categorical Exclusions (CEs). 40 C.F.R. § 
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policies have significantly reduced NEPA-imposed transaction costs for 
leases and permits, aiding in the United States’ energy independence.199 
While traditional energy resources have enjoyed a partial reprieve 
from the rigors of NEPA analysis over the past ten years, renewable 
energy sources have no streamlined policies that would help reduce their 
cost.200 Although the Obama Administration’s 2008 economic stimulus 
package provided direct funding for many green energy projects,201 the 
market remains disincentivized to choose renewable projects over 
traditional energy resources absent a reduction in the transaction costs of 
renewable energy programs.202 As the climate continues to change, the 
United States must reform its regulatory policies to put carbon-neutral 
technologies on a level playing field with traditional energy resources. 
This is even more critical for Arctic communities, which are experiencing 
a rapid deterioration of their environmental stability from greenhouse gas 
emissions.203 To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and allow communities 
to localize energy production though microgrids based on wind or solar 
technology, the United States needs to allow green energy programs to 
rapidly proceed through the federal regulatory process. Deregulation 
must go beyond assisting the traditional energy producers. It must also 
spur green technologies. In Alaskan rural communities, this regulatory 
effort would not only reduce emissions, but incentivize investment in 
marginalized communities, a hallmark of environmental justice. 
 
1508.4 (2012); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15942 (2012)). While this would be the most 
comprehensive and sweeping way to exempt renewable resources from costly 
NEPA analysis, expansion of CEs is dangerous and undercuts the purpose of 
NEPA. See, e.g., Jeffery A. Berger, False Promises: NEPA’s Role in Airport Expansions 
and the Streamlining of the Environmental Review Process, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 279, 
318–20 (2003) (discussing the expansion of CEs during the George W. Bush 
administration).  
 199.  Russell, supra note 70, at 1059 (“Many agencies have developed 
regulations that streamline the NEPA process, truncating or curtailing the 
application of NEPA.”). Oil and gas is not the only energy sector that benefited 
from a streamlined NEPA process. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also 
released regulations allowing for the categorical exclusion of numerous nuclear 
power plant activities, including waste disposal and inspections. 10 C.F.R. § 
51.22(c). 
 200.  Russell, supra note 70, at 1066. 
 201.  See id. at 1067–68 (describing in detail the different policies the Obama 
Administration implemented). 
 202.  See id. at 1051–52 (stating that NEPA’s procedural requirements are time 
consuming and expensive for both traditional and renewable energy projects and 
should be streamlined to encourage “rapid transition to clean energy”).   
 203.  See Marguerite E. Middaugh, Comment, Linking Global Warming to Inuit 
Human Rights, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 179, 184–86 (2006) (documenting the effect 
climate change has had on northern people around the world). 
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Canada’s Environmental Assessment Act 
 
Unlike NEPA, which has both EIS and EA, the CEAA now has one 
standard environmental impact statement and environmental assessment 
process that agencies can use.204 Furthermore, the CEAA allows agencies 
the discretion to suggest follow-up monitoring of the projects if the 
environmental outcomes of the project are uncertain at the outset.205 
While this follow-up monitoring is discretionary,206 Canada’s CEAA has 
begun turning the environmental permitting process into an ongoing 
study rather than a one-time analysis unable to predict environmental 
dangers that appear over the course of a project.207 
The CEAA is not without its shortcomings though. The James Bay 
project in northern Quebec, for example, had a pre-project environmental 
impact statement that miscalculated the downstream effects of a dam on 
the estuarine environment and caribou migration routes, which the local 
Cree Indians depend on for subsistence.208 These failures underscore the 
need to reduce the emphasis on pre-planning and replace it with a 
stronger emphasis on post-planning monitoring to adapt to the changing 
conditions on the ground.209 Learning from these mistakes, Canada has 
created the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, which 
accumulates summaries and contact information for environmental 
impact statements in a searchable database.210 This program is an “active 
information hub,” identifying the “best practices” and reference 
standards for future impact assessments so that actors do not repeat past 
 
 204.  Meinhard Doelle, CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?, 24 J. 
ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 1, 7 (2012). The CEAA also contains a “panel review” option, 
but the 2012 Act has significantly narrowed this provision and it is not relevant to 
my analysis here. Id. at 8–10.  
 205.  See Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 949 (outlining the discretionary 
procedures for the CEAA). 
 206.  Only about half of the Canadian federal impact statements included some 
form of monitoring. Id. at 949 n.161. 
 207.  See id. at 949–50 (“Canada has done some important pioneering work by 
identifying the shortcomings of a purely predictive approach to environmental 
impact assessment, placing post project monitoring and assessment squarely on 
the policy agenda.”). 
 208.  Id.; RICHARD K. MORGAN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: A 
METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 182–83 (1998).  
 209.  The Deepwater Horizon blowout is another classic example of the failure 
of pre-planning as the estimates for the “worst case scenario” blowout were a 
fraction of the final spill. See Marcia K. McNutt et al., Assessment of Flow Rate 
Estimates for the Deepwater Horizon, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2011/ph240/mina1/docs/FRTG-final-
report3_10_11-final-pdf.pdf. 
 210.  Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 2012, c 19, § 78 (Can.). 
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mistakes.211 Congress should amend NEPA to include provisions 
allowing for continued post-project monitoring and a searchable database 
of EISs to reduce the backlog of redundant information and poor 
predictions that have previously plagued NEPA analyses.212 
Interestingly, environmental reviews have not been a major 
regulatory issue for the AEA in the Northwest Territories.213 Electrical 
inspectors have taken up the role of a regulatory body for many projects, 
which can cause some delays when new technologies are introduced.214 
However, the lack of hassle with bureaucratic environmental assessments 
is a boon for organizations trying to implement new technologies because 
predictive pre-project assessments are inaccurate since many of these 
projects are new and can only be assessed once the project is 
implemented. This hands-off approach was thought to be changing as 
Justin Trudeau campaigned on a platform to reinvigorate the CEAA after 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper had reduced its significance for many 
projects throughout Canada.215 Increased environmental regulation, 
especially increased consultation with indigenous peoples during the 
assessment process, was included in Prime Minister Trudeau’s first 
discussion paper on the environment in June 2017.216 Lamentably, the 
paper speaks only in broad strokes and a specific plan to overhaul the 
CEAA has yet to be implemented.217 Hence, neither the Canadian federal 
 
 211.  Karkkainen, supra note 71, at 950.  
 212.  See id. at 931 (recommending the implementation of post-project 
monitoring and “‘adaptive mitigation’ measures” when faced with uncertainty); 
id. at 922–23 (describing the “avalanche” of lesser quality information crammed 
into EISs as an “exhaustive compilation[] of recycled information”). 
 213.  The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency does not have 
jurisdiction in the Northwest Territories. It has been replaced with the Mackenzie 
Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, a First Nation, Northwest Territories 
board. This shift was part of land claim settlements in the Northwest Territories. 
MACKENZIE VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW BOARD ANN. REP. 1999-2000 
(on file with author) [hereinafter MVEIRB].  
 214.  Telephone Interview with Louie Azzolini, Former Executive Director, 
Arctic Energy Alliance (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 215.  See Tamsyn Burgmann, Justin Trudeau Unveils Liberals’ Environmental 
Platform, TORONTO STAR (June 29, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/news/ 
canada/2015/06/29/justin-trudeau-unveils-liberals-environmental-
platform.html (noting that Trudeau planned to restore environmental review). 
 216.  GOV’T OF CANADA, ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY REVIEWS: 
DISCUSSION PAPER 8 (2017), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/themes/ 
environment/conservation/environmental-reviews/share-your-
views/proposed-approach/discussion-paper-june-2017-eng.pdf. 
 217.  See id. (“The federal government’s response to bold recommendations for 
reforming the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act . . . is 
‘underwhelming’”); e.g., Carol Linnitt, Is Trudeau Quietly Turning His Back on 
Fixing Canada’s Environmental Laws?, DESMOGCANADA (Sept. 12, 2017, 10:34 AM), 
https://www.desmog.ca/2017/09/12/trudeau-quietly-turning-his-back-fixing-
canada-s-environmental-laws (noting the gaps in the government’s plan).  
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government nor the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency will 
likely regulate Arctic energy programs in the near future, leaving the 
AEA to continue working under the current regulatory scheme.218 
While the Canadian system of environmental review does allow for 
more diversity in its pre-planning approach, even allowing some 
jurisdictions to regulate with their own boards,219 both systems can still 
cause delay, which is problematic for the health of local communities. In 
the United States especially, the lack of streamlining procedures for 
renewable energy resources hampers the impact of renewable energy 
spending, and reduces the incentives for the private market to invest in 
green energy.220 As the weather around the globe continues to become 
increasingly extreme, the United States needs to play a leading role in the 
rapid expansion of renewable energy resources by streamlining the 
process so the private market can flourish. 
D.  Community Involvement and Grassroots Engagement 
Even with superior technology, profitable funding schemes, and a 
streamlined regulatory scheme, successful alternative energy systems 
will only be successful if the communities benefitting from the programs 
work to support and maintain the project. To make alternative energy 
programs successful in rural Arctic villages, the local communities need 
to be involved in every phase of the implementation in order to ensure 
the programs will be self-sustaining. This section will discuss several case 
studies from around the world and the AEA, and use those examples to 
recommend solutions to the barrier of community involvement. 
Personalized Recruitment Strategies 
 
One way to implement a healthy, self-sustaining energy program is 
to encourage the already-interested members of communities to recruit 
their neighbors to support green energy projects.221 A prime example of 
these personal recruitment strategies is the Clean Energy Resource Team 
 
 218.  See Meinhard Doelle, supra note 204, at 6 (“[The Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency] is given broad discretion to determine whether a federal 
[environmental assessment] is required for that particular project.”). 
 219.  See MVEIRB, supra note 213 (explaining that the Mackenzie Valley 
Environmental Impact Review Board is responsible for environmental assessment 
in the Mackenzie Valley).  
 220.  See Russell, supra note 70, at 1066 (“NEPA presents a significant barrier to 
development of green energy, particularly in light of the streamlined process 
already in place for some fossil fuels and nuclear energy.”). 
 221.  See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7569 (describing the 
effectiveness of community recruitment strategies). 
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(“Resource Teams”), created in 2003 by the Minnesota Department of 
Commerce, the University of Minnesota, and the non-governmental 
organization Minnesota Project.222 Six regional Resource Teams were 
created to promote renewable and energy conservation throughout 
Minnesota.223 During Resource Teams’ startup phase, organizers invited 
potential local participants to community meetings via direct mail and 
online marketing; interested individuals were then added to the Resource 
Teams’ mailing list.224 Additionally, the Resource Teams identified people 
in the community who were members of environmental organizations 
and had prior experience working towards conservation and renewable 
energy.225 This strategy of personally appealing to participants led to a 
highly successful campaign for the Resource Teams.226 In fact, over sixty 
percent of the people that joined Resource Teams said they learned about 
it from a particular person or organization.227 These programs have been 
most successful in communities, like those in the rural Arctic, where the 
population is less transient and more invested in the health of the 
community.228 
The AEA already uses this technique in their own work in the 
Northwest Territories, even if they do not call it “personalized 
recruitment.” The message of the AEA is to hold communities and 
community leaders accountable for their own success within their 
community energy profile.229 By encouraging the community to 
participate, the AEA puts pressure on community leaders to work 
towards programs for the community’s success based on the village’s 
relative well-being to its participatory nature.230 The communal nature of 
Arctic village life also places pressure on communities who do not 
participate, where recalcitrant leaders are seen as hurting the community 
and society as a whole by not participating.231 Personalized recruitment 
of villages, while different from the person-to-person contact used in the 
Resource Teams, has been successful in compelling community leaders to 
 
 222.  Id. at 7568; see generally SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC 
VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995) (describing the idea of “personalized 
recruitment” in the political organization context).   
 223.  See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7568. 
 224.  Id. at 7569. 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 7569–70. 
 228.  Id. at 7570 (extolling the idea of “neighborly communities” as the perfect 
environment for personalized recruitment strategies). 
 229.  See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes. 
 230.  See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes.  
 231.  See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes. 
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interact with the AEA to create programs similar to those implemented 
by their neighbors, who have more comfortable lives because of their new 
energy projects.232 
Using Existing Social Institutions to Create Community Support 
 
Another important strategy for community support is to use the 
existing structures within the community to grow the community’s 
communal assets.233 These programs could be particularly successful in 
rural Alaska, where villages may have a village corporation and 
community buildings,234 which can be the first buildings connected to the 
new energy source. Over time, these “green” buildings within the 
community can build a sense of pride and encourage further 
development of alternative energy sources.235 
Community ownership schemes were successfully replicated in the 
United Kingdom, starting with the Scottish program Energy4All, which 
was initially set up in Baywind.236 This cooperative ownership scheme is 
now prevalent throughout the United Kingdom,237 and the model could 
be particularly successful in communities with a longer history of 
communal ownership, like Alaskan villages, and in remote communities 
where the drive to diversify and promote local economic growth, 
however small, is crucially important.238 
The obvious application of communal ownership in the Alaskan 
context is the ANC corporate structure. Using the ANC as an already 
existing form of communal ownership that local villagers share can be 
another way to stimulate community-wide support for a project that 
could help local villagers personally and their stock generally. Also, 
communal programs have been most successful in rural areas, like 
western Alaska, where villagers have a stronger sense of community and 
pride for their land, which can be fostered by projects that not only keep 
money in their pockets but bring pride to the community and its 
leaders.239 
 
 232.  See infra Part III.C and accompanying notes. 
 233.  See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7570 (describing the 
benefits of various local community projects centered on renewable energy as a 
way to foster community support). 
 234.  See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
 235.  See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7570. 
 236.  See Walker, supra note 74, at 4401 (2008). 
 237.  Id. at 4403 (discussing how the program in Wales, Oxfordshire, and 
Aberdeenshire was slow to develop, taking over ten years). 
 238.  Cf. id. (noting this model “is particularly valuable for remote communities 
where diversification and regeneration needs are high, or when rural towns and 
villages become galvanised around a low-carbon agenda”). 
 239.  Another part of the community that could be tapped for communal 
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The Need for Strong Democratic Actors 
 
Successful renewable energy programs in rural Arctic villages will 
also depend on strong democratic actors who are proud to engage both 
economically and personally within local communities.240 Creating strong 
civic culture to foster energy projects will require strong action, including 
constant communication between ANCs and their village constituents; 
land bargaining between communal interests held by village 
corporations, regional ANCs, and the federal government; timetables in 
community energy plans to hold villages, ANCs, and contractors 
responsible for their projects; and community leaders acting as the voice 
of their village when programs do not go as planned.241 Most people who 
will participate in programs such as these are not motivated by personal 
gain, but by a sense of pride in place and time.242 A well-known 
commercial for the Bristol Bay Native Corporation uses the tagline, “from 
a place that’s always been,” to impress upon people the notion that 
western Alaska is a special and unique place for the communities and 
people who choose to live there.243 As climate change continues to alter 
the Earth in ways that are expected to worsen over the coming half 
century, we must be mindful of the hard work and sacrifice required by 
people in northern climates to adapt to their changing landscape. Making 
these changes will require hard work and sacrifice from the men and 
women who call these remote areas home. A sense of pride in their own 
community and the Arctic as a whole will be an important factor in 
creating successful community energy projects in Alaska and throughout 
the Arctic. 
 
ownership is local missions and churches, who could make their mark on the 
community by fostering some form of renewable energy on their church grounds. 
See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7570 (“In the case of climate change, 
for instance, members of various faith communities are being called upon to 
undertake personal actions that extend well beyond formal lobbying or appeals 
for letters to elected representatives.”). 
 240.  BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A 
NEW AGE 132 (1984) (arguing that strong democratic actors create “a political 
community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into free 
citizens and partial and private interests into public goods.”). 
 241.  See id.; see also Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7572 
(emphasizing the importance of “developing a system of public participation 
involving the communication of shared interests, bargaining over those interests 
that are not held in common, agenda setting and other less explicitly political 
activities”). 
 242.  See Hoffman & High-Pippert, supra note 73, at 7572 (“[T]hose people 
likely to participate in a voluntary, community-based initiative are motivated by 
an appeal to the notion of community, rather than personal benefit.”). 
 243.  BristolBayNativeCorp, BBNC Balance TV Ad, YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T0LFtg2yZk0. 
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III. VILLAGE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES: CORPORATE 
CULTURES AND COMMUNITY ENERGY PROGRAMS 
After looking at the potential barriers to renewable energy 
production and solutions to these problems, this Note turns next to the 
solutions and considers some of the current economic and governmental 
programs in place designed to help native communities achieve self-
determination. The difficulty of imposing the western economic structure 
of corporations upon historically subsistent cultures is well known and 
understood.244 However, the corporate form, while still controversial, has 
become increasingly profitable for native communities as the law around 
ANCSA matures.245 In fact, the corporate form has been praised as 
collective property structure that can be profitable while still allowing 
native traditions over communal ownership and decisionmaking to 
flourish.246 Over time, native corporate structures have become more 
profitable as the law surrounding the unique system has developed.247 
Consequently, the corporations have gained more political power (in 
 
 244.  See, e.g., Gigi Berardi, Natural Resource Policy, Unforgiving Geographies, and 
Persistent Poverty in Alaska Native Villages, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 85 (1998); Douglas 
M. Branson, Square Pegs in Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Corporations Under Corporate Law, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 103 (1979); Marilyn J. Ward 
Ford, Twenty Five Years of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Self Determination 
or Destruction of the Heritage, Culture, and Way of Life of Alaska’s Native Americans?, 
12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 305 (1997) (discussing the way ANCs have sold rights to 
old growth timber to make short term profits, betraying the cultural mandate of 
the historical village culture); Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331 (1992); 
John F. Walsh, Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38 STAN. L. REV. 227 
(1985); see generally Michael M. Pacheco, Toward a Truer Sense of Sovereignty: 
Fiduciary Duty in Indian Corporations, 39 S.D. L. REV. 49 (1994) (arguing that the 
differences between traditional federal Indian Law and Corporate Law cannons 
of construction at the state level require a federal Indian Corporations Act to 
alleviate the confusion). 
 245.  Stephen Colt, Alaska Native and the “New Harpoon”: Economic Performance 
of the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 155, 162–63 
(2005) (numbers have shown steady growth since the early 1990s). But see Gavin 
Kentch, A Corporate Culture? The Environmental Justice Challenges of the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 813, 829–30 (describing how some 
projects profit the region at the expense of individual communities). 
 246.  For a thoughtful and in-depth look into this idea from the Canadian 
perspective, see Richard Janda, Why Does Form Matter? The Hybrid Governance 
Structure of Makivik Corporation, 30 VT. L. REV. 785 (2006). This theory has also been 
advanced towards Alaskan Native Corporations. See Linda O. Smiddy, 
Responding to Professor Janda—The U.S. Experience: The Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) Regional Corporation as a Form of Social Enterprise, 30 VT. L. 
REV. 823 (2006). 
 247.  James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: Delivering 
On the Promise, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1, 3 (2007). 
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Canada)248 and become more involved in governmental contracting (in 
the United States).249 This political and economic clout, however, is rarely 
used to provide funding and community support for alternative energy 
growth.250 
There are some examples, however, of ANCs that have started 
initiatives to curb fossil fuel usage and promote renewable energy.251 
These programs show great strides in the right direction, and some have 
started to develop grassroots movements among neighboring villages.252 
These programs are not only good ways to save money on energy and 
reduce emissions, but also provide jobs for citizens of these rural 
villages.253 
Even though these programs have been successful, all of these 
corporate structures have a mandate to improve the social conditions of 
native villagers and could use this mandate as a means to efficiently fund 
and channel money into programs to make renewable energy programs 
possible.254 While the projects already started are encouraging, and their 
 
 248.  See Janda, supra note 246, at 806–08.  
 249.  See Colt, supra note 245, at 163. 
 250.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 45; see also Thierry Rondon & 
Stephan Schott, Towards a Sustainable Future for Nunavik, 50 POLAR RECORD 1, 12 
(2013). Nunavik “depends 100% on fossil fuel supplies from the south that are 
very expensive and are steadily increasing in price.” Id. Additionally, all of the 
communities that are part of the Makivik Corporation are separated from the 
electric grid of Quebec and have not developed any renewable resources. Id. 
 251.  See, e.g., FIRE ISLAND WIND LLC, http://fireislandwind.com/ (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2018); Renewable Energy, NANA, http://nana.com/regional/resources/ 
alternative-energy/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018); Bering Straits Development 
Company (BSDC), BERING STRAITS NATIVE CORPORATION (last visited Mar. 17, 2018); 
Calista Corporation—2016 Project, OFFICE OF ENERGY POLICY AND PROGRAMS, 
https://www.energy.gov/indianenergy/calista-corporation-2016-project (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2018). Sealaska completed a renewable energy feasibility study in 
2003. SEALAKSA CORP., RENEWABLE ENERGY FEASIBILITY STUDY (2003), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f29/sealaska_tep_nov03.p
df.  
 252.  Anna Rose MacArthur, Calista region looks to Kuskokwim Bay villages for 
energy innovation, ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.alaskapublic. 
org/2017/04/24/calista-region-looks-to-kuskokwim-bay-villages-for-energy-
innovation/.   
 253.  Id. (“There’s another way strengthening the village’s renewable energy 
system has strengthened the ability to subsist—by providing jobs.”).  
 254.  See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 
92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2012)); 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1605(b) (2012) (explaining one of the purposes of the settlement is 
to improve the “real economic and social needs of Natives.”). The Makivik 
Corporation has been described as a “hybrid form.” Janda, supra note 246, at 786. 
It advertises its corporate objective “to promote the welfare, advancement, and 
education of the Inuit” on its website. Makivik Mandate, MAKIVIK CORP., 
http://www.makivik.org/corporate/makivik-mandate/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2018). 
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apparent success is exciting, all ANCs and Canadian native corporations 
should be investing in renewable energy resources. It is precisely this 
corporate institutional structure that should now be used to implement 
many, if not all of the policy recommendations made in Part II of this 
Note. 
A.  The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)255 was enacted 
in 1971 in order to extinguish all native land claims in Alaska.256 ANCSA 
established thirteen for-profit regional corporations and two hundred 
and twenty-five for-profit village corporations and conveyed to them 
around forty million acres of land and a trust fund of $962.5 million.257 
While the village corporations are not subsidiaries of the regional 
corporations, the regional corporations do approve village corporate 
plans and distribute money to them.258 The dualism of the corporate 
structure continues in the land ownership, with village corporations 
owning the surface rights and regional corporations owning the 
subsurface rights.259 In 1987, ANCSA was amended to create settlement 
trusts, intended to insulate “land and other assets from the business risks 
of operating a for-profit business corporation.”260 
These three organizations—regional corporations, village 
corporations, and settlement trusts—work together to achieve ANCSA’s 
purposes: to improve the economic well-being of the villages with 
resource development projects,261 and to provide for “the real economic 
and social needs of Natives . . . with maximum participation by Natives 
in decisions affecting their rights and property.”262 Some have argued that 
these social needs extend beyond general quality of life to include 
 
 255.  Pub. L. No. 92-203. 
 256.  See Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 2. 
 257.  43 U.S.C. § 1618. 
 258.  § 1606(i). 
 259.  §§ 1606(i), 1611(a), (e)–(f). 
 260.  Smiddy, supra note 246, at 828; Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
Amendments of 1987 § 10, Pub. L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1629e (2000)). 
 261.  Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 4. Prior to ANCSA, Alaska Native 
populations were so poor that one New York Times reporter wrote, “The worst 
slums in the United States are not in the racially turbulent quarters of New York, 
Cleveland, Chicago, or Los Angeles. By all available indices of poverty, they are 
sparsely strewn, like garbage on an ice floe, along the nation’s desolate sea frontier 
with the Soviet Union.” Homer Bigart, Eskimos in Alaska Turn to Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 1966, at A1. 
 262.  43 U.S.C. § 1601(b). 
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conservation and environmental justice.263 Considering the extreme cost 
of fuel in rural Alaskan villages, the introduction of renewable energy 
resources, would not only reduce villages’ carbon footprint, but also 
reduce the cost of living, ameliorating the poverty in native villages and 
allowing villagers to spend money on other necessities for a subsistence 
lifestyle.264 Many ANCs now have sufficient financial stability to be able 
to focus on these social and environmental goals to further the purposes 
of the original vision of ANCSA: to see native communities financially 
solvent and socially stable for generations.265 
Furthermore, investment in Alaskan native villages is not a losing 
economic investment for many ANCs.266 Poverty, spurred in part by cost-
of-living expenses, is a core barrier to economic self-determination for 
native villages, and investment in energy infrastructure could empower 
Alaska Natives to work for their community improvement.267 In fact, 
ANCs’ investments in villages, while small in scale, have been lucrative, 
even though the size of the communities limits the gross local 
investment.268 While the corporations also experienced rapidly 
diminishing returns on investment in rural communities, recovery of 
investment and returns could be higher with modern Internet technology 
assisting in communication with distant villages.269 NANA Regional 
Corporation, the native corporation in northwestern Alaska, has already 
proven that economic investment in water, sewer, and electric utilities can 
spur economic development, owning all the utilities in the North Slope 
area to provide jobs and still turn a profit for its shareholders.270 As these 
 
 
 263.  See Kentch, supra note 245, at 819 (discussing the tension between the 
ANCs’ duties to develop and to conserve the land). 
 264.  See MacArthur, supra note 252 (showing that heating savings can be spent 
on other necessities, such as gasoline, needed to subsist in the modern arctic); see 
also Renewable Energy, NANA, http://nana.com/regional/resources/alternative-
energy/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2018) (“With the soaring cost of energy, many 
residents find themselves in a position of having to choose between heating their 
homes and feeding their families.”). 
 265.  See Colt, supra note 245 at 163 (discussing corporations’ financial gains in 
the 1990s); Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 4 (noting the corporations’ financial 
achievements by the mid-2000s); 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (explaining the Act’s dual 
mandates). 
 266.  See Colt, supra note 245, at 164 (running a regression analysis that 
determined regional corporations made money in local village enterprises from 
1976 to 1994). 
 267.  See Smiddy, supra note 246 at 838; Lee Huskey & Thomas A. Morehouse, 
Development in Remote Regions: What Do We Know?, 45 ARCTIC 128, 134 (1992). 
 268.  See Colt, supra note 245, at 164 (finding local investment had an annual 
estimated average return of twenty-one percent of book equity from 1976 to 1992). 
 269.  See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 270.  See Colt, supra note 245, at 161; Smiddy, supra note 246, at 851. 
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examples illustrate, the established regional ANCs’ duty to invest in the 
economic infrastructure of their shareholders’ villages does not need to 
be a profit loss as well. 
These programs will undoubtedly face challenges. The dynamic 
between village corporations and regional corporations has been difficult 
for some ANCs,271 and the entrenched political voices on corporate 
boards of directors are hard to overcome.272 While the splitting of surface 
and mineral rights was intended to give some additional control to the 
villages over their land to prevent majority rule by the largest 
communities within each region, the legal complications have led to 
bankruptcy for at least one ANC, leaving the village corporations as their 
creditor.273 This legal wrangling between village corporations and their 
regional counterparts underlies the system created under ANCSA and the 
confusion over rights and responsibilities inherent in a new system.274 
NANA, however, has overcome this confusion and turmoil by 
incorporating the village corporations within its own corporate 
structure.275 This streamlined approach may be one way to reduce the 
inefficiencies within the ANCSA corporate system, and create a 
 
 271.  See Smiddy, supra note 246, at 842 (noting that village corporations have 
been less successful than their regional counterparts at achieving social progress). 
 272.  See Kentch, supra note 245, at 824 (entrenched interests can lead to a 
feeling of disenfranchisement by shareholders). For a case study of these 
entrenched interests occurring at the village corporation level, look at the case 
study of the Eyak tribal members lawsuits over the sale of old growth timber 
within tribal lands. See Ford, supra note 244, at 328–33. 
 273.  See Colt, supra note 245, at 161 (describing the plight of the Bering Straits 
ANC, which signed over its property rights to the village corporations in Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proceedings). 
 274.  See Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 16 (discussing the litigation that has 
followed ANCSA’s regulatory requirements for village eligibility); see generally 
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (describing the inefficiencies in a 
market system when competing interests do not know their roles within a 
property scheme). Another problem within this system has been the prohibition 
against descendants receiving stock, if they were born after 1971. 43 U.S.C. § 
1604(a) (2012). While subsequent amendments have allowed ANCs to amend 
their bylaws to admit shareholders born after that date, 43 U.S.C. § 
1606(g)(1)(B)(i)(I), only six corporations have done so to date. See Kentch, supra 
note 245, at 824; Ben Matheson, Calista shareholders vote to enroll ‘Afterborns’, 
ALASKA PUB. MEDIA (July 12, 2015), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2015/07/13/ 
calista-shareholders-vote-to-enroll-afterborns/. As the descendant population 
grows relative to the aging shareholder population, animosity between the village 
communities and the regional corporations will likely increase without a more 
unified message. Unsurprisingly, the corporations that have included 
descendants include two of the ANCs that have been most successful 
economically, Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) and NANA. 
 275.  See Smiddy, supra note 246, at 849–51 (describing NANA’s unique 
structure among the ANCs and how it has led to more inclusion and political 
power). 
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streamlined structure that will improve the participation by village 
corporations while at the same time helping regional corporations be 
more responsive to their shareholders’ needs.276 
ANCs’ original goals under ANCSA were to provide for native 
communities economically, socially, and environmentally.277 While 
ANCs have become economically powerful and are now some of the 
largest companies in Alaska,278 they have not done enough to create social 
stability in many rural communities.279 Renewable energy programs are 
not only economically viable ANC investments, but would also reduce 
the poverty of their shareholders by reducing their consumption of 
expensive diesel fuel and reducing the village carbon footprint to achieve 
environmental justice for marginalized communities “along the nation’s 
desolate sea frontier.”280 
B.  The Makivik Corporation of Northern Quebec 
Canada has also experimented with the corporate form as a way to 
empower rural native cultures. The Makivik Corporation of Nunavik, in 
northern Quebec, is considered a success for providing significant 
political and economic clout to the people of the Nunavik region.281 
Unlike the ANCs, the Makivik Corporation was designed as a not-for-
profit corporation.282 ANCs and Makivik, however, were both designed 
to incorporate traditional communal governance structures of native 
tribes with the western market economy in order to aid the transition 
between the two worlds.283  
 
 276.  This incorporation will only occur, however, if the village corporations 
see the freestanding power of the regional corporations and trust their internal 
leadership, which could be hard if the corporations are not successful.  
 277.  43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)–(b). 
 278.  See Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 4. 
 279.  Even NANA has had trouble balancing the economic success of the Red 
Dog Mine with the subsistence needs of the nearby town of Kivilina. See Kentch, 
supra note 245, at 827–34 (describing how the Kavilina villagers were excluded 
from the decision-making process regarding the mine, despite its environmental 
and general health impacts); see also Adams v. Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc., 2006 
U.S. Dist. WL 2105501 (D. Alaska July 28, 2006) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claims of 
increased lead levels in the soil around the access road to the mine within 
Kivilina’s subsistence hunting zone). 
 280.  Bigart, supra note 261, at A1. 
 281.  Bernard Simon, Canada’s Indians Pondering How to Invest Land Payouts, 
N.Y. TIMES. (Nov. 6, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/06/business/ 
canada-s-indians-pondering-how-to-invest-land-payouts.html. 
 282.  An Act Respecting the Makivik Corporation, R.S.Q., c S-18.1, § 16 (Can.); 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Nov. 11, 1975, in James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement and Complementary Agreements No. 1 (1998). 
 283.  See Janda, supra note 246, at 786 (detailing how Makivik was intended to 
bridge the Inuit and contemporary market cultures). 
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Makivik has experienced even more success than most ANCs in 
creating social and political communities within Nunavik that have 
political clout in Quebec City.284 However, on energy reform, Nunavik 
communities are still cut off from the Quebec electric grid, and a recent 
decision by Hydro Québec to raise heating oil rates for off-grid 
communities underscores the lack of political capital expended by 
Makivik for providing cheaper, greener energy for its communities.285 
Makivik was chartered in 1978 as a not-for-profit corporation, 
thereby exempting it from taxation.286 Since incorporation, Makivik has 
donated over eighty million dollars towards its corporate mandate: to 
relieve poverty; promote welfare and education of the Inuit; develop, and 
improve Inuit communities; and “to foster, promote, protect, and assist in 
preserving the Inuit way of life, values and traditions.”287 While Nunavik 
has a regional government, the elections to the board of Makivik are 
perceived as the most important elections in Nunavik, making Makivik 
the “de facto government of Nunavik.”288 Makivik has been a steady 
conservative investor, which has, over time, increased its corporate 
portfolio to include two airlines, Nunavik Creations (a clothing and art 
company for local artisans), Nunavik Furs, Halutik Enterprises (a fuel and 
heavy equipment company for Nunavik), and Kautaq Construction.289 
Unlike many ANCs, which have diversified into finance and companies 
outside the state of Alaska, Makivik’s portfolio focuses on businesses and 
services that will directly benefit the Nunavik communities.290 
This corporate form has benefited the Nunavik people by creating 
smooth transactions between western contractors and the communities of 
the corporation.291 Unlike the complicated village-regional split under 
ANCSA, the single, not-for-profit form has provided an established 
blueprint for western companies to work with the villages of Nunavik.292 
 
 284.  See id. at 806–09 (describing the author’s impression that Makivik has 
enhanced the capacity of Nunavik’s Inuit peoples to engage in public 
government). 
 285.  Press Release, Makivik Corp., Hydro Québec’s Second-Tier Rate Increase Will 
Hurt Nunavik Residential Consumers (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.makivik.org/ 
hydro-quebecs-second-tier-rate-increase/. 
 286.  See R.S.Q., c S-18.1, § 4. 
 287.  Id. § 5. 
 288.  Janda, supra note 246, at 789. 
 289.  Subsidiary Companies, MAKIVIK CORPORATION, http://www.makivik.org/ 
subsidiary-companies/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).  
 290.  See Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 4; Subsidiary Companies, supra note 289 
(describing each subsidiary company as representing “the interests of its 
shareholders, who are the Inuit of Nunavik.”). 
 291.  See Janda, supra note 246, at 796–800 (explaining how Makivik’s corporate 
form has led to reduced transaction costs associated with the agreements it enters 
into). 
 292.  Id. at 793. 
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Since Makivik is a not-for-profit corporation, it uses the money many 
ANCs would use for shareholder dividends to invest in projects and 
companies within the Nunavik region.293 This structure has been easier to 
adopt because of the pre-existing law around not-for-profit corporations, 
unlike ANCs, which dealt with prolonged litigation about the exact 
contours of ANCSA.294 
Politically, Makivik has gone even further than ANCs in trying to 
combine the traditional native structure with the corporate form by 
including an advisory board of elders for the Board of Directors.295 This 
inclusion has resulted in the perception that Makivik is not only an 
“entrepreneurial”296 economic body, but also an entity that has a 
relationship with the traditional ways of the Inuit peoples, unlike the 
boards of regional ANCs, which have been occasionally sued for breaches 
of fiduciary duty by their shareholders.297 This unified message has led to 
a strong political presence at the provincial level as well, creating a 
functioning self-governance structure for the Nunavik people.298 
Despite all of this success, the Makivik Corporation has not been able 
to provide for renewable power projects for its Nunavik villages, which 
still rely on heating oil to provide energy for their homes.299 Furthermore, 
the recent decision by Hydro Québec to increase the heating oil rates in 
these communities shows how Makivik has not focused on energy as a 
major goal of environmental justice for Nunavik peoples.300 Since 1994, 
Makivik has provided a subsidy program for heating oil in Nunavik 
villages.301 However, as climate change and poverty persist in the villages 
 
 293.  An Act Respecting the Makivik Corporation, R.S.Q., c S-18.1, §§ 4–5, 7–10 
(Can.).  
 294.  See Linxwiler, supra note 247, at 3; Janda, supra note 246, at 796–800. 
 295.  Janda, supra note 246, at 795. 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  See Ford, supra note 244, at 326–33 (describing various legal disputes 
between ANCs and their shareholders). 
 298.  See Janda, supra note 246, at 807–08. Not all Native Corporations in 
Canada have been as successful. The Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc. (NTI) was 
established as a private corporation for Nunavut in 1993, six years before the 
creation of the territory. Unlike Makivik’s clear social welfare mandate and 
ANCSA’s clear economic mandate, NTI’s bylaws were “bathed in rights-focused 
language” giving the organization a weak economic structure. Id. at 810. While 
this has given NTI a major role in Nunavut’s social development programs, it has 
not been able to divest itself from the political structure of the Nunavut 
government, reducing the effectiveness of the corporate form as a driver of 
economic self-determination. See About Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, NUNAVUT 
TUNNGAVIK, INC.; Janda, supra note 246, at 812–13. 
 299.  Rondon & Schott, supra note 250, at 11. 
 300.  See Makivik Corp., supra note 285.  
 301.  Heating Oil Subsidy Program, MAKIVIK CORPORATION (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.makivik.org/heating-oil-subsidy-program/. 
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of Nunavik, it will be interesting to track whether Makivik will include 
climate change and environmental justice of the northern communities 
within its social justice corporate mandate under its bylaws.302 
In sum, while the Makivik Corporation’s not-for-profit status and its 
focus on intertwining village elders within the decisionmaking process 
has led to a unified message for increased social and political capital in 
Nunavik, Makivik has not been able to leverage this into clean energy 
programs in the region. Like ANCs, the focus has been on social and 
cultural programs, which, while benefiting the community, have not 
substantially alleviated widespread poverty in the northern villages. 
C.  Arctic Energy Alliance and Community Energy Programs 
As an alternative to the corporate structure of the Makivik and 
ANCSA corporations, the Northwest Territories created the AEA twenty 
years ago to address their rural communities’ needs for cheap, effective, 
and efficient energy sources.303 This organization has become the “lead 
not-for-profit organization helping communities, consumers, producers, 
regulators, and policymakers to work together to reduce the cost and 
environmental impacts of energy usage in the Northwest Territories.”304 
Shunning direct involvement with native groups, the AEA in many ways 
has become the anti-structure of the traditional native corporate structure, 
empowering native communities to take responsibility for their own 
needs, while providing needed assistance when asked to.305 
Currently, the AEA employs twenty-two full time staff in five 
regional offices throughout the Northwest Territories.306 The AEA has a 
working budget of around $3.2 million, which was spent on a multitude 
of projects throughout thirty-two different rural villages in the Northwest 
Territories.307 AEA’s basic approach to community energy planning 
involves a six step process: (1) forming a group of community members 
interested in energy, (2) creating an overview of how energy is used in the 
community, (3) evaluating potential projects and partnerships, (4) 
 
 302.  An Act Respecting the Makivik Corporation, R.S.Q., c S-18.1, § 5 (Can.). 
 303.  About Us, ARCTIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, http://aea.nt.ca/about-us (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 304.  ARCTIC ENERGY ALL., AEA ANNUAL REPORT 2015-2016, at ix (2016) 
[hereinafter AEA ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 305.  Telephone Interview with Louie Azzolini, Former Executive Director, 
Arctic Energy Alliance (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 306.  AEA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 304, at ix. 
 307.  For a detailed look at the various programs that the AEA is involved in, 
including retrofitting and installation of efficient heaters, promotion of wind-
diesel power, and commercial energy conservation, see Programs, ARCTIC ENERGY 
ALLIANCE, http://aea.nt.ca/programs (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
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assembling the promising projects in a Community Energy Plan (CEP) 
call to action, (5) implementing and monitoring the projects listed in the 
CEP, and (6) revising the plan as needed.308 This seemingly simple plan is 
tailored to each village to create a plan to work for the individuals in the 
community. 
Unlike other government programs working in this industry, the 
AEA compels community involvement by holding individual 
communities responsible for half of the funding for CEPs. In one instance, 
all the communities around a village received assistance for installing 
efficient heating units except for one village that did not come through 
with its share of the funding.309 The AEA thereby creates accountability, 
as it catalyzes community action when leaders fail to hold up their job to 
procure the benefits the AEA can provide. Further, since community 
members have invested their own time and money into the program, 
there is assurance that AEA benefits will be used and appreciated.310 This 
forced participation seamlessly plays into the communities’ desire to 
reduce their “dependence upon high cost, carbon-intensive diesel 
generation”311 toward programs that will allow community members to 
spend money on other necessities for life in the Arctic.312 
Another unique feature of the AEA is its cultural neutrality. Unlike 
the Makivik Corporation and the ANCs, the AEA is not involved with 
any native groups and therefore can run the organization independently, 
without any eye towards employment of shareholders (in the case of 
ANCs) or towards cultural improvement (in the case of the Makivik 
Corporation). This not only helps unify the message of the AEA, but also 
clarifies the purpose towards providing support on clean energy and 
allows the AEA to hold true on its vision as a pragmatist organization by 
staying impartial and objective.313 It is noteworthy that even without this 
cultural connection to the communities the AEA is serving, participation 
rates in the community programs in the Northwest Territories are the 
highest among the community programs throughout Canada.314 This 
level of involvement and pragmatism could also be achieved by ANCs 
 
 308.  Communities, ARCTIC ENERGY ALLIANCE, http://aea.nt.ca/communities 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 309.  Telephone Interview with Louie Azzolini, Former Executive Director, 
Arctic Energy Alliance (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Genevieve St. Denis & Paul Parker, Community Energy Planning in Canada: 
The Role of Renewable Energy, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 2088, 2094 
(2009). 
 312.  See MacArthur, supra note 252.  
 313.  Telephone Interview with Louie Azzolini, Former Executive Director, 
Arctic Energy Alliance (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 314.  St. Denis & Parker, supra note 311, at 2094. 
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and the Makivik Corporation by creating a subsidiary corporation which 
could focus exclusively on community energy programs to keep the 
message clear, consistent, and reliable.315 
The AEA is a true success story for community energy programs in 
the Arctic and could be duplicated in other jurisdictions. However, to 
catalyze such a program, there needs to be a central figure to spearhead 
the effort. In the Northwest Territories, J. Michael Miltenberger filled this 
role when he launched the AEA and supported it through the Northwest 
Territories legislature.316 He then served as the finance and environment 
minister for the Northwest Territories until 2015.317 The AEA’s efforts to 
expand into Nunavut have been successful, but the push for a similar 
organization in the territory has not been advocated at the policy level to 
the point of creating a sister organization.318 If these types of hybrid 
programs—taking the best from the native corporate structure and 
infusing it with a pragmatic government structure—are ever to take hold, 
politicians in Arctic jurisdictions will need to push these programs and 
foster them though the early years to create lasting change in energy 
policy for rural Arctic villages. 
D.  Renewable Energy Alaska Project Moves Towards the AEA 
Model 
While Alaska may not have a program as robust or as established as 
the Northwest Territories’ AEA, the Renewable Energy Alaska Project 
(REAP) is an organization with many of the same goals and a similar 
model to the AEA. Not surprisingly, REAP has been at the forefront of 
many of the renewable energy programs that have been set up 
throughout Alaska and will likely be a significant player in creating new 
 
 315.  See, e.g., Wind Resources, ENERGY SECRETARIAT, DEPT. OF ECON. DEV. & 
TRANS., GOV’T OF NUNAVUT, http://nunavutenergy.ca/node/18 (last updated 
2016) (discussing the failed wind projects in Nunavut in the late 1990s and early 
2000s); see supra Part II.A (discussing the advancements in renewable energy 
technology). 
 316.  Telephone Interview with Louie Azzolini, Former Executive Director, 
Arctic Energy Alliance (Jan. 6, 2017). 
 317.  Chris Windeyer, Voters Deliver a Blunt Demand for Change, CBC (Nov. 24, 
2015), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nwt-election-analysis-demand-
change-1.3332112.   
 318.  Another interesting feature of the AEA is its loose interpretations of its 
own bylaws. While the bylaws only allow Northwest Territories organizations to 
be members of the organization, see AEA Bylaws 1 (June 29, 2007) (on file with 
author), Nunavut has been a member of the AEA for the last few years and plans 
to continue to be a member into the future. This loose interpretation of their own 
bylaws underlies how responsive the AEA is to the changing conditions on the 
ground responding to what the constituencies are asking for without the 
bureaucracy typical of government programs. 
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renewable energy opportunities throughout the state.319 REAP has 
emphasized efficiency within the community before anything else and 
has employed a unique approach for each village, much like the 
community energy plans relied on by the AEA.320 By engaging 
community leaders and crafting unique solutions to each individual 
villages’ problems, REAP has followed AEA in creating an energy 
efficient culture in many Alaskan villages. 
REAP was founded in 2004 by Chris Rose “with the goal of 
promoting the use of renewable energy in Alaska.”321 Since then it has 
grown to include more than eighty organizations, including ANCs, 
utilities, and governmental agencies.322 Unlike the AEA, however, REAP 
is focused on more than just rural energy projects. REAP also sponsors 
educational programs in primary schools throughout the state and 
promotes collaboration between business and utilities to create 
partnerships in renewable resource generation throughout the state.323 
REAP also acts as an advocacy program for lien energy programs 
throughout the state by lobbying the Alaska Legislature to adopt 
programs like PACE and other energy projects such as a Green Bank of 
Alaska and Railbelt Reform.324 While the diverse approach is necessary, 
and the work REAP does is extremely valuable for renewable energy in 
Alaska, an organization dedicated to working with rural villages like 
AEA may be needed to really see the full buy-in needed to make rural 
renewable energy projects the norm in Alaskan villages in the coming 
decades. 
CONCLUSION 
The barriers to renewable energy in the Arctic take many forms. The 
technical challenges of creating diesel engines that are at once efficient on 
their own and able to connect to renewable resources when available is a 
barrier that organizations like ARENA have been able to overcome with 
efficient solar-diesel and wind-diesel generators. The financial barriers to 
 
 319.  See Shaw, supra note 1 (noting the numerous renewable power projects 
REAP has initiated in remote communities, particularly those incorporating wind 
turbines).  
 320.  Id. 
 321.  About Renewable Energy Alaska Project (REAP), RENEWABLE ENERGY ALASKA 
PROJECT, http://alaskarenewableenergy.org/index.php/about-reap/ (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2018). 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE SOUTHEAST PARTNERSHIP, http://sustainablesouth 
east.net/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018); ISLANDED GRID RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://islandedgrid.org/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). 
 324.  REAP Programs, RENEWABLE ENERGY ALASKA PROJECT, http://alaska 
renewableenergy.org/index.php/programs/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
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fund renewable projects in Alaska are hard to come by with Alaska’s 
current budget constraints after the fall of oil prices and the current 
federal administration’s push to reduce government spending. But 
programs like PACE, margin money financing, direct funding, and pay-
as-you-go services through ANCs can overcome this barrier with 
innovative thinking and a positive eye towards the future of clean energy 
in rural villages; forward-thinking politicians like Michael Miltonberger 
in the Northwest Territory, who has doggedly pursued the establishment 
of the AEA and watched the organization become a renewable energy 
success story, can break regulatory barriers; calls to reform and streamline 
the NEPA process for clean energy to put traditional and renewable 
resources on a level playing field should fall in line with the new 
administration’s goals to deregulate and encourage innovation; 
empowering and holding rural villages accountable for their own 
development goals will help encourage outside funding and native 
corporations to invest in their communities; and, finally, investment in 
these communities can help community members to obtain jobs or, at a 
minimum, a sense of pride in the development of their village. 
As we continue to develop new and innovative ways to create 
technical solutions and creative financial programs, we must always 
remember that as a global society we are in this battle to adapt to climate 
change together, and every solution and innovation can make a 
difference. While few people live in the Arctic regions of Canada and 
Alaska, these are perfect places, surrounded by stable governments and 
financial institutions, to test out different microgrid and renewable 
technologies so we can institute these policies world-wide. This Note is 
not intended to be the final say on any issue, it is rather a guide, a starting 
point for further research, as we all embark together to help solve the 
world’s energy problems one diesel generator at a time. 
 
